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I.  INTRODUCTION TO HEDGE FUNDS 
Exceptions  from  regulation  under  securities,  investment  company, 
investment  advisory,  and  tax  laws  define  hedge  fund  structures  and 
distinguish hedge funds from mutual funds.  The exceptions also permit hedge 
funds  to  (i) utilize  substantial  economic  leverage,  (ii)  pay their investment 
advisers  fees  that  materially  exceed  those  a  mutual  fund  may  pay  its 
investment advisers, and (iii) prevent the United States from imposing taxes 
on their foreign  investors or collecting a corporate level tax from  the  fund. 
Promoters of  hedge funds design their funds to fit these regulatory exceptions. 
As  exceptions  change,  hedge  funds  adjust  in structure  in order  to  remain 
unregulated. 
Hedge  funds  are  actively managed investments  that pool investors' 
capital  in  order  to  acquire,  own,  and  trade  one  or  more  of securities, 
commodities, and financial products.  Although the first hedge fund made its 
appearance  as  early  as  1949/  legal  scholarship  on  hedge  funds  did  not 
materialize until 1966 when the number of  funds began to grow.
2  During the 
1990s, hedge funds befan to capture substantial investment capital from high 
net worth individuals.  Initially,  some  funds  may have  employed hedging 
strategies that  suggested they had  investment plans to  protect capital,4  but 
soon hedge funds  evolved into high risk and,  so investors hoped, high return 
investment vehicles for entities with excess liquidity and wealthy individuals. 
While  some hedge funds  still employ hedging strategies in part,  especially 
market neutral funds,s  the range of hedge fund strategies no longer relates to 
any fundamental hedging concept. 
Because their investors and investment managers were generally very 
wealthy,6 hedge funds  developed mystique, as clubs that limit access to the 
rich and famous  tend to  do.  Hedge  funds  and  their managers  gained the 
reputation of  having apparent ability to wield enormous, economic influence 
1 Douglas W. Hawes, Hedge Funds - Investment Funds for the Rich, 23  Bus. LAWYER 576, 
577 (1966-67) (attributing first hedge fund to A.W. Jones & Company in 1949). 
2 Id.; see infra note 37. 
3  The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), without reliable data,  estimated that 
there were approximately 400 hedge funds in 1992 and, based on the estimates of  participants 
in an SEC rouodtable on hedge funds, 6000 in 2003.  SEC Staff Report, Implications of  the 
Growth  of  Hedge  Fuods  1  (Sept.  2003),  available  at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studieslhedgefunds0903.pdf. 
4  A  hedge is the purchase of positions that offset each other by moving in opposite value 
directions.  Increase in the value of one position would match decrease in the value of the 
other.  In order to make a profit, the investor would allow some spread, either value or timing, 
between the offsetting positions. 
5 See discussion of  hedge fund investment strategies, infra Part 5. 
6 This article uses the terms ''investment manager"  and "investment adviser"  interchangeably 
when referring to hedge fund advisors. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  325 
that even might threaten the financial stability of  the markets.?  But, like those 
clubs for the rich and famous, once allowed to enter, one discovers that what 
is going on inside is expensive but far more mundane than it appeared while 
one  waited  in  line  outside  the  club.  Conversations  inside  are  not  more 
interesting; returns from hedge fund investing are sometimes better but often 
the same as or worse than market indices. 
8 
Paucity of  publicly available information about hedge funds amplified 
the  mystique.  That information  scarcity  resulted  from  limitations  on  the 
SEC's regulatory authority over hedge funds  and their investment managers. 
Generally,  neither the  funds  nor their managers  had  to  register under the 
statutes that give the SEC regulatory oversight over mutual funds
9 and their 
investment  advisers.1O  Except  for  very  large  funds  with  500  investors  or 
more/
1  the  SEC  could not demand  information reporting for hedge  funds' 
holdings and investment strategies. 
Periodically,  incidents  occur  in  the  hedge  fund  industry  affecting 
investors  or markets  severely  and  adversely.  The  collapse  of Long  Term 
Capital Management in  1998 is an example of such an incident.
12  In 2004, 
Bayou Capital failed  and its princWals  initially dropped from  view,  leaving 
investors  with  significant  losses.  The  principals  later  surrendered  to 
authorities  and  pleaded  guilty  to  conspiracy  and  fraud  charges. 14  More 
7 The collapse of Long Term Capital Management, an extremely high visibility and heavily 
leveraged hedge fund group, supported this view as  the N ew York Stock Exchange and a 
consortium of investment banks bailed the group out to protect the integrity of the markets. 
See Roger Lowenstein, WHEN GENIUS FAILED:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (Random House 2000) (relating story of  growth and collapse of  LTCM); see 
Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management - Report of  the 
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, by representatives from the Commission, 
the  Treasury  Department,  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  Commodity  Futures  Trading 
Commission (Apr. 1999) (examining market crisis that failure ofLTCM precipitated). 
, Mark Kritzman,  Portfolio Efficiency with Performance Fees, ECONOMICS AND  PORTFOLIO 
STRATEGYNIlWSLETTER (Feb. 1,2007) (emphasizing asymmetry in performance fee structures 
[see discussion of  performance fee structures irifra in Part 3]  as a key contributor to drag on 
investment returns and concluding that allocating one's portfolio to ten uncorrelated hedge 
funds  would be likely to yield a lower return than an allocation to  a series of index funds 
because of the high hedge fund fees).  The Standard and Poor's hedge fund index for 2005 
advanced ouly 2.3% corupared with a 4.9% for the Standard and Poor's 500 index.  Jenny 
Anderson, By the Numbers:  Hedge Funds and  Half  Truths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,2006, at C8; 
see Aaron Pressman, Hedge Funds: The Pool is Shrinking, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Jan.  19, 
2006), 
http://www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflashljan2006/nf20060119_7052_dbOI6.htm. 
9 The Tnvestment Corupany Act ofl940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
10 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to -21 (2006). 
11  Securities Exchange Act §12(g)  requires registration of any fund if it has  500 or more 
owners.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2006). 
12 Supra note 7. 
13  Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,2005, at Cl. 
14 Hedge fond founder,  CFO plead guilty in fraud case; Losses estimated at $450 million in 
Bayou scandal, CHICAGO TRlBUNE, Sept. 30, 2005, at C3. 326  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
recently,  the  SEC  sued  the  founders  of  HMC  International  for 
misappropriating the fund's assets to  support their lifestyles. IS  And in 2003 
the  New  York  State  Attorney  General  filed  a  complaint  against  Canary 
Capital Partners accusing it of illegal and fraudulent trading practices for late 
trading of mutual  fund  shares  - a practice benefiting the  hedge  fund  and 
harming the other investors in the mutual funds Canary late traded. 16 
Such  events draw public attention to  hedge funds  and an occasional 
public outcry for  regulation.  However,  the  outcry is  not from  hedge fund 
investors nor is it grass roots.  The media generate or respond to that attention 
and outcry with news coverage and commentary, whether the incident injures 
only  the  hedge  fund's  investors  or  threatens  market  stability  generally. 
However, empirical evidence of correlation between the hedge fund  tradin~ 
activities  and  major  movement  in  the  financial  markets  is  lacking. I 
Moreover,  increased regulation  of and  oversight  over hedge  funds  has not 
reached the top of Congress' legislative agenda.  Historically, Congress failed 
to enact legislation regulating hedge funds.  In fact,  on several occasions the 
contrary has occurred.  Congress has removed regulatory constraints from the 
hedge fund industry. 
Contrary  to  Congress's  easing  of hedge  fund  regulation,  the  SEC 
recently sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to extend mandatory registration under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to  many hedge fund managers. 18  The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the new regulations shortly 
following  the  date  on  which  managers  first  had  to  register  under  the 
regulations. 19  The  revised  regulations  would  have  altered  the  manner  in 
which an investment advisor counts clients.  Managers who previously did not 
have to register because they had fewer than fifteen clients would have had to 
count each investor in a hedge fund - rather than only the fund itself - as a 
client for purposes of  the fewer than fifteen client rule. 
Since  the  DC  Circuit  rejected  the  revisions  to  the  client  counting 
rule,20 the SEC could not compel investment advisers to a limited number of 
15 Jenny Anderson, S.E.c. Accuses a New Jersey Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 
C4. 
16  Complaint  available  at  http://www.oag.state.ny.us/presS/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf. 
Late trading is the purchase after market close of  a mutual fund's shares at the pre-close net 
asset value of  the shares rather than the new after close value.  The late trader captures the 
advance in the share price for events that occurred during the day, if any, by buying at the 
frevious day's lower price. 
7  See  Barry  Eichengreen  &  Donald  Mathieson,  Hedge  Funds  and  Financial  Markets: 
Implications for Policy in HEDGE FUNDS AND  FINANCIAL MARKET DYNAMICS,  International 
Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 166,2, 3 (Washington D.C. 1998). 
18  Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA-
2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10,2004) (adding Reg. § 203(b)(3)-2 requiring investment 
advisers to count the underlying owners of  private funds as clients). 
19 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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funds  to register.  In order to  assure  greater transparency from  investment 
advisers, the SEC promulgated a proposed antifraud regulation that, if  adopted 
as  a  final  regulation,  would  broaden  and  clarify  disclosure  requirements 
applicable to registered and unregistered investment advisers to hedge funds 
and other private investment pOOIS.21  The proposed rule renders it unlawful 
for  an  investment adviser,  whether or not registered under the  Investment 
Advisers Act to "make any untrue statement of  material fact or to omit to state 
a  material  fact  .  .  .  to  any investor  or prospective  investor  in a  pooled 
investment vehicle.,,22  The proposed regulation also prohibits deceptive  or 
manipulative practices.23  However, the proposed regulation is broader than 
the general antifraud rule
24  as  it applies  even if the statement, omission or 
deceptive practice does not accompany the purchase or sale of an interest in 
the pooled investment vehicle or any other security.25 
A.  Mutual Fund and  Hedge Fund Risk and  Liquidity Contrasted 
Hedge  funds  are  not  mysterious,  although  trading  strategies  some 
managers utilize are intricate and complex.26  Hedge funds are simply pooled 
investments desigued to avoid regulatory constraints that might inhibit profit 
for the investors and the investment managers.  By avoiding regulation, the 
funds  may adopt investment strategies that involve greater risk of loss than 
mutual funds.  Concomitantly, hedge funds historically targeted investors who 
(i) economically could make an investment of  $100,000 or more and bear the 
risk of  its loss, if  loss occurred, (ii) willingly traded greater risk for the chance 
to capture greater rewards, and, as outlined in the next paragraph, (iii) did not 
require the daily redemption liquidity of  open-end mutual funds or the public 
trading market for closed-end funds. 
Mutual funds constituting most regulated investment companies come 
in two varieties:  open-end funds  and closed-end funds.  Open-end mutual 
funds issue and redeem shares at net asset value per share, as investors invest 
and disinvest.
27  Closed-end funds raise capital through offering their shares, 
but redeem the shares only when they dispose of  their portfolio positions and 
do not reinvest the proceeds from the sales.  Closed-end fund shares trade on 
exchanges or over the counter with market pricing.  28  While share price of 
closed-end funds theoretically ought to track net asset value per share, instead 
21  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8, 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8 (2007 proposed).  SEC Release 33-
8766,72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 2007). 
22 Id  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8(a)(I).  Compare the language of  the general antifraud 
rule under the Exchange Act, Rule IOb-5. 
23Id.  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8(a)(2). 
24 Rule IOb-5. 
25  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8 and see  discussion of enforcement action in the release 
document, SEC Release 33-8766, supra note 21, at note 26. 
26 See infra Part 5. 
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4(3), 5(a)(I) (2006).  No other trading market exists for the shares. 
28Id. §§ 80a-4(3), 5(a)(2). 32S  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
share price often lags net asset value.  With respect to  liquidity,  open-end 
mutual funds  generally allow daily redemption  of interests  and closed-end 
funds  facilitate exchange listing and, accordingly, market trading of shares.
29 
Open-end mutual  funds  may have  as  much as  fifteen  fcercent  of their net 
assets in restricted securities and other illiquid positions.  0  Illiquid positions 
constitute  part  of the  value  of the  fund  and  must not  impede  the  fund's 
redemption of shares that shareholders tender.31  The board of directors of  the 
fund must determine the value of  the illiquid positions in good faith. 32 
Hedge funds  that invest in the public securities markets customarily 
offer their investors the opportunity to redeem their interests at least annually, 
but rarely more frequently than monthly.  No statute requires the funds to pay 
the redemption amount within any specific period, but most funds seek to pay 
the bulk of the redemption price, often ninety percent, within ten to fifteen 
days of the permissible redemption date.  The remainder of the price follows 
when the fund fmally determines its net asset value for the redemption date. 
Depending on the risk profile of the fund,  some hedge funds invest in equity 
positions  that promise  substantial  long-term return,  but  in  the  interim  are 
illiquid.  Sometimes, positions become illiquid because of changes affecting 
the specific issuer of  the securities or, more generally, market conditions. 
When a fund holds such illiquid investments, the manager places them 
into a "side pocket," which is a separate account on the fund's books.  Funds 
handle their side pockets in a variety of ways:  (i)  some funds  estimate the 
value  of side  pocket  positions  and  include  a  payment  for  them  in  the 
redemption price; (ii) more often, funds permit investors to redeem the liquid 
portion of  their interests but retain the investor in the fund with respect to the 
investor's share of illiquid positions;  (iii)  other funds  exclude  side pocket 
value from the redemption proceeds for investors wishing to redeem from the 
fund  before  the  illiquid positions  are  sold,  so  that the redeeming  investor 
simply relinquishes any interest in the side pocket; (iv) in order to avoid harsh 
results, managers occasionally create a separate class of fund interests with 
some  investors  only sharing in  the  liquid positions  in the  fund's  portfolio, 
while others, with a longer-term appetite for commitment, participate in the 
side pocket portion of  the fund as well?3 
29 ld.  § SOa-22(e) (providing limited exceptions for extraordinary market events, prohibiting 
any delay in redemption of  tendered shares longer than seven days). 
30 Revisions of  Guidelines to Form N-IA, Release Nos. 33-6927, rC-IS612, 57 Fed Reg. 
9,S28 (Mar. 20, 1992). 
31  15 U.S.C. § SOa-22(e). 
32 15 U.S.C. § SOa-2(a)(41). 
33  Hedge funds  also  must isolate  their positions in initial  equity public  offerings,  so  that 
investors in the hedge fund who are broker-dealers or affiliated with or related to broker-
dealers do not participate in the gain from that portion ofthe hedge fund's portfolio.  National 
Association  of  Securities  Dealers  Maoual  Rule  2790, 
http://nasd.complinet.comlnasd/display/display.htm1?rbid=IIS9&elemenUd=1159000466. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  329 
Additionally,  there  are  hedge  funds,  including  venture  capital  and 
private equity funds that invest almost exclusively in private equities that are 
illiquid.  Those  funds  often have their own life  cycle of two to five  years 
during which investors may not withdraw capital.  Private equity funds may 
raise money in anticipation of identifying a single opportunity, for example 
purchase and turn around of a failing business.34  While limited opportunities 
to withdraw invested capital characterizes closed-end mutual funds as well as 
certain hedge funds (and for that matter direct investment in corporations, as 
well), the similarity to such long term capital commitment ends there.  Hedge 
funds  lack the active  secondary trading market of closed-end mutual  funds 
although promoters sometimes will help to place an interest in the fund for an 
investor who wishes to dispose of one.  Recent regulations requiring hedge 
fund  managers  to  register  as  investment advisors  initially motivated  some 
managers to require  a two year capital commitment for  all the  funds  they 
managed so that the funds would continue to be a single client of  the advisor, 
rather than all the owners of the fund being deemed clients for purposes of 
registration under the Advisers Act.35  However, that emerginf trend reversed 
following the judicial holding that the regulation was invalid.3 
B.  Regulatory Frameworks and  Article Goals 
While the body of scholarship on hedge funds has increased over the 
past several years,37 the literature offers little by way of a simple explanation 
of the  structures that hedge  fund promoters utilize  and why promoters use 
those  structures.38  This  article will seek to  fill  that gap  in  scholarship  by 
34 Something akin to a merchant banking fimd. 
35 An Advisors Act Regulation that the DC Circuit overtorned in Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 
19,  exempted  funds  with a  two-year  minimum  lock-up  from  the  look through  rule  for 
counting advisory clients.  Rwes and Regulations,  Investment Advisers Act of 1940,  17 
C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(d)(l)(ii) (2006). 
36 Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 19. 
37 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70:  Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds 
and Stock Market Volatility - What Regulation by the Securities and  Exchange Commission is 
Appropriate?,  80  NOTRE  DAME  L.  REv.  909  (2005)  (recommending  greater  regulatory 
intervention to prevent excessive  specwation and avoid market crashes).  See  also  Laura 
Edwards, Note, Looking through the Hedges:  How the SEC Justified its Decision to Require 
Registration  of Hedge  Fund Advisers,  83  WASH.  U. L.  Q.  603  (2005)  (explaining  and 
discussing origin and purposes of new, but invalidated, rule governing registration of  hedge 
fimd advisers); Joseph Hel1rung, Note & Comment, Emerging Issues in Banking Regulation: 
Hedge Fund Regulation:  Investors are Knocking at the Door,  but can the SEC Clean House 
before  Everyone  Rushes  In?,  9  N.C.  BANKING  JNST.  317  (2005)  (examining  new  rule 
requiring many investment advisers to register);  Rory B. O'Halloran, Comment, An Overview 
and Analysis of  Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation, 79 TllL. L. REv.  461 
(2004)  (discussing  regulatory proposals  affecting  hedge  fimds);  Erik J  Greupner,  Hedge 
Funds Are Headed Down-market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
1555 (2003) (discussing trend toward registered hedge fimds and regulatory changes). 
38 William Fung &  David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE 
331 (1999) (quantitatively describing hedge fund structure and performance and differing as a 330  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
describing  some  basic,  popular  hedge  fund  structures  and  explaining  the 
regulatory planning that accounts for them.  39  The simplest answer to why 
promoters  design  hedge  fund  structures  to  avoid  registration  under  the 
Investment  Company  Act  is  that  hedge  funds  permit  managers  to  share 
directly in the fund's investment gain, while mutual funds do not.40 
The principal U.S. regulatory frameworks that might affect hedge fund 
investing adversely, if  fund organizers fail to structure the funds correctly, are 
the Securities Act of 1933  (the "Securities ACt"),41  the  Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act,}42 the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(the "Investment Company Act"),4  the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the 
"Advisers Act"),44 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code"),45 and the 
Commodities Exchan~e Act (the "CEA,,).46  Other regulatory structures such 
as state securities law 7 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 ("ERISA,,)48 sometimes impact the operation of  hedge funds. 
Part 2 of  this article describes the structuring of  hedge funds to exempt 
them from  regulation under the  Securities Act,  the Exchange Act,  and the 
Investment Company Act.  Part 3 explains how the exemption of  hedge funds 
from  regulation  under  the  Investment  Company  Act  enables  the  funds' 
investment advisers  to  avoid regulation under the Advisers  Act but,  more 
importantly, to remain free from the limitations on the fees the advisers may 
primer from this article in its very limited description of  the reasons for the legal structures 
managers select). 
39 For readers wanting greater detail on hedge funds than this article offers, see Shartsis Friese 
LLP,  Douglas  L.  Hammer,  Carolyn  S.  Reiser,  et aI.,  U.S.  Regulation  of Hedge  Funds, 
Business Law (2005). 
40 17 C.F.R. § 275.205.  See discussion infra Part 3. 
41  15 U.S.C. §77a-aa. 
42 1d.  §§ 78a-mm. 
43 ld. §§ 80a-1 to -64. 
44 ld. §§ 80b-1 to -21. 
45 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (2000). 
46 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f(2000). While many hedge funds trade some commodities that the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") regulates, this article will not address 
commodities regulation because commodities regulation has limited impact on the structure of 
hedge funds.  Most hedge funds are exempt from registration under the CEA for the same 
structural reason that they are exempt under the Investment Advisors Act.  See Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, app. E (2000); see 
also Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chairman of  the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, Keynote Address at the Securities Industry Association Hedge Funds 
Conference (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.cftc.gov/opalspeeches04/opabrown-hruska-22.htm 
(arguing that commodities pools are hedge funds and that most hedge fund advisers are 
regulated by the CFTC, either as commodity pool operators or because they trade regulated 
commodities, so that SEC registration of  the advisers is unnecessary). 
47  State  securities laws are commonly known as  Blue-Sky laws  and  sometimes including 
registration and reporting requirements even when federal law does not. 
.. Employee Retirement Income  Security Act (ERISA), Pub.  L. No.  93-406, 99  Stat.  829 
(1974); see Shartsis Friese LLP, supra note 39, at 249-265; infra note 270. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  331 
collect.  Part 4 identifies federal income tax rules that contribute to structural 
choices and result in a mixture of domestic and offshore funds to meet the 
needs of  differing classes of  investors.  Part 5 discusses hedge fund strategies 
and  the  importance  of leverage.  Part  6  concludes  by  synthesizing  the 
regulatory frameworks to an understanding of the simple fundamental nature 
of hedge funds  and briefly explores the question of the need for additional 
regulation of  the hedge fund industry. 
II.  S1RUCTURlNG  HEDGE  FuNDs  FOR  EXEMPTION  FROM  REGISTRATION 
UNDER TIlE SECURITIES ACTS AND TIlE INvESTMENT COMPANY ACT 
The Investment Company Act49  followed upon the  Securities Act50 
and the Exchange Act5
!  and reflects the period of economic uncertainty in 
which Congress  enacted it.  The Investment Company Act seems to be a 
product of  the great depression that followed the stock market crash of 1929, 
but adopts a somewhat different philosophical approach to investor protection 
than the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  The Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act sought to protect the investing public by assuring equal access 
to information for all market participants.  The theory underlying disclosure is 
that professional market participants assimilate publicly available information 
and disseminate  it to  the  investing public  in more  usable  form.  In turn, 
investors protect themselves if  they have the material information concerning 
the investments.  Mandatory and ongoing information disclosures achieved 
that goal.  Under the Securities Act, an issuer of securities has to disclose a 
broad array of fmancial and operational information as a condition to entry 
into the public capital markets.  52  In order to  prevent manipulation of the 
secondary market for an issuer's outstanding securities, the issuer continually 
must update public information concerning its operations and fmances. 53  An 
issuer's insiders  must not trade  the  issuer's  securities if the  insiders  have 
information concerning the issuer that is not yet in the public domain.  54 
A.  Investment Company Act and  Debt 
While the Investment Company Act similarly relies  heavily on the 
disclosure philosophy to protect the public, it is more parental in its regulatory 
protection of  investors.  Along with registration, the Investment Company Act 
limits  transactions  with  affiliated  persons,55  requires  funds  to  maintain 
49 Pub. L. No 76-768; 54 Stat. 789 (1940). 
50 Pub. L. No. 73-22; 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
51 Pub. L. No. 73-291; 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
52 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000). 
53 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000). 
54 [d.  § 10(b); Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
55 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§  80a-9, -10, -12, -17 (2006) (respectively covering 
affiliated  persons  as  employees,  directors,  overlapping  ownership,  and  prohibited 
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sufficient liquidity to redeem shares,  56  regulates corporate governance of the 
funds,57  and establishes rules for pricing of the funds' portfolios.  58  Perhaps 
most significantly, the Investment Company Act exhibits a strong bias against 
debt.  Section I of  the Investment Company Act declares that:59 
the  national  public  interest and  the  interest of investors  are 
adversely affected 
(7) when investment companies by excessive borrowing and the 
issuance  of excessive  amounts  of senior securities  increase 
unduly the speculative character of  their junior securities. 60 
The  purpose  of the  Investment  Company  Act  is  "to  mitigate  and  .  .  . 
eliminate" those conditions that adversely affect the public.61  As a result of 
the bias against indebtedness in the Investment Company Act, a fundamental 
distinction  between  investments  required  to  register  under  the  Investment 
Company Act and investments free from the registration requirements is that 
tight  limits  on borrowing  apply  to  registered  companies.  A  mutual  fund 
registered under the Investment Company Act62  may not incur indebtedness 
unless  it has  a minimum  coverage  of the  debt of three  hundred percent.  63 
Coverage of debt is  the  ratio of the  company's net asset value  to  the  face 
amount of the debt. 64  Investment companies also would be prohibited from 
buying  securities  on margin65  and effecting  short sales,66  but the  SEC  has 
never issued the necessary regulations to  implement this provision.  Instead 
the  SEC  has  relied  on  the  more  general  debt  coverage  provision  to  limit 
mutual funds' indebtedness and short sales.67  The Investment Company Act 
protects registered investment companies and their owners from the risk of 
561d.  § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of  shares in the company). 
57 See id.  § 80a-16 (covering board of  directors and elections). 
50 See id.  § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of  shares in the company). 
591d.  § 80a-I(b). 
60 Emphasis added. 
61  15 U.S.C. § 80a-I(b).  See the SEC's study of  the investment company industry that laid the 
foundation  for  the  Investment  Company Act  SEC,  Investment  Trusts  and  Investment 
Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 707 (1939); SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 
H.R. Doc. No. 70 (1939); SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 
279, at 1563-1940 (\939). 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-S (providing for registration of  investment companies). 
631d.  § 80a-18(a), -18(f) (applicable to closed-end funds and open-end funds). 
64 ld. § 80a-18(h). 
651d.  § 80a-12(a)(1). 
66 ld. § 80a-12(a)(3). 
67 Guidelines for the Preparation of  Form N -8B-l, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (1972) (treating short 
sales and margin purchases as forms of  indebtedness or senior securities subject to Investment 
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debt  financing  of their  investment portfolios68  but simultaneously prevents 
them from reaping the benefits of enhanced economic returns that the leverage 
from borrowing might generate.69 
In order to employ economic leverage through borrowing, organizers 
must  structure  hedge  funds  so  that  the  funds  do  not  become  registered 
investment companies.70  Although the  Investment  Company Act  does  not 
make registration expressly mandatory,71  unregistered investment companies, 
unless exempt from registration,72 may not sell securities,73 including interests 
in themselves.74  While there are classes  of specifically exempt investment 
companies that need not register, the classifications are so narrow that they do 
not  offer  the  hedge  fund  promoter  a  practical  opportunity  to  avoid 
registration.75  Therefore, their organizers select one of two basic structures 
for  the  funds  that prevent the  funds  from  fitting  the  investment  company 
defmition.76  The  investment  company  definition  has  an  operatin§ 
component,77 a manner of offering component,78 and an investor component. 7 
If the  fund  avoids  either  the  operating  component  or both the  manner  of 
offering and investor components, it is not an investment company.  Hedge 
funds  cannot  avoid  the  operating  component  of the  investment  company 
defmition,  as  hedge  funds  are  or hold  themselves  "out as  being  engaged 
primarily ...  in the business of  investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities. 
,,80 
Hedge funds meet the manner of offering and ownership components 
of the exceptions to  the investment company definition.  Hedge funds  meet 
the  limited  ownership  component  of the  exceptions  to  the  investment 
company definition.  Section 80a-3(  c  )(1)  ("section 3c1") funds
81  do  so  by 
limiting the number of the beneficial owners of  their shares to one hundred.
82 
68  Mutual Fund Use of Derivatives,  1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 952 (1994) (analyzing and 
recommending  solicitation  of  public  comment  on  investment  activities  of  registered 
investment companies in derivative products). 
60 See discussion ofleverage irifra Part 5. 
70 See 15 U.S.C. § SOa-IS (applying only to registered investment companies). 
71 ld. § SOa-8. 
72 ld. § SOa-6. 
73 1d.  § SOa-2(a)(36) (defining "securities" for the Investment Company Act). 
741d.  § SOa-7. 
75  ld.  § SOa-6  (exempting possessions based investment companies that do not sell interests 
outside possession; funds  subj ect to specific alternative regnlatory oversight; and funds  the 
SEC rnles exempt). 
761d.  § 80a-3. 
771d.  § SOa-3(a)(I)(A). 
78 1d.  § SOa-3(c). 
7°ld. 
,old. § SOa-3(a)(I)(A). 
811d.  § SOa-3(c)(I); see text commencing infra note 109 for a more detailed description. 
!12  ld.  §  SOa-3( c  )(1 )(A)  to  (B)  (including  some  special  rnles  for  determining  beneficial 
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Section 80a-3(  c  )(7) ("section 3cT') funds83 do so by limiting their investors to 
qualified purchasers, who - in the case of individual investors - own at 
least $5 million of  investments.  84 
The manner of offering  test prohibits hedge  funds  from  making or 
presently proposing  to  make  a  public  offering  of their  securities.  85  The 
Securities  Act  also  distinguishes  public  from  non-public  offerings  of 
securities  and whenever there is  a public offering imposes registration and 
prospectus requirements on issuers and underwriters of securities.86  A non-
public offering,87 which participants in the securities industry generally refer 
to as a private placement of securities, meets the manner of offering test for 
purposes of  the Investment Company Act.  88 
The SEC has promulgated a non--exclusive, safe harbor definition of  a 
private placement of  securities that permits the issuer to sell its securities to an 
unlimited number of accredited investors and no more than thirty-five other 
investors.89  Although  it is  not the  exclusive means  for  qualification as  a 
private placement,9o the safe harbor is simple and practical for the hedge fund. 
The thirty-five purchasers  who  are  not accredited investors  need have no 
particular economic qualifications but nevertheless must meet a sophistication 
test.91  The sophistication test requires that the investor have knowledge and 
experience in business matters or the assistance of a representative who does 
have that knowledge and experience.92  lfthe issuer sells securities to a single 
unaccredited investor, the safe harbor requires the issuer to make many of  the 
disclosures that would be necessary in connection with a registered offering.93 
On the other hand, there is no specific disclosure requirement under the safe 
harbor if  the issuer sells to accredited investors only.94  Accredited investors 
831d.  § 80a-3(c)(7); see text commencing with infra note 135 for discussion  . 
..  ld. § 80a-2(a)(51); see text accompanying infra note 139 for discussion. 
" ld. § 80a-3(c)(l), -3(c)(7). 
86 Securities Act of  1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006). 
87 1d.  § 77d(2). This section is  generally viewed as the private placement exemption.  The 
statute  does not use the term "private  placement or offering."  Rather,  it exempts  from 
registration "transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering." ld. 
88 ld. § 80a-3(c). 
89 Regulation D under the Securities Act.  Securities Act Rule 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 
(2006). 
90  15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) reaches other issuances of  securities that do not meet all the conditions 
of  the Regulation D safe harbor.  15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 
(2006). 
91  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2006). 
92 ld.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (2006) (defining purchaser representative). 
93  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2006). 
94 ld.; Regolation D notes that the anti-fraud provisions do require the issuer to provide 
material information concerning the offering.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1).  Moreover, if 
proposed regolation § 206(4)-8, supra note 21, becomes final, it will impose broad antifraud 
requirements on all investment advisers, whether or not registered.  As a practical matter, 
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purportedly are those who can fend for themselves so that they do not need the 
protections  of the  Securities  Act.  They have  adequate  sophistication  and 
economically are able to bear the loss of  their investment.  95 
Given the limited number of  one hundred investors a section 3c1  fund 
may have if  it wishes to avoid the investment company definition,96 admitting 
non-accredited investors diminishes the hedge fund promoter's opportunity to 
raise capital.  As individuals need have only one million dollars of assets -
and that amount even jointly with their spouses97 - or incomes individually 
in excess  of $200,000,  or $300,000  with  spouses,98  to  become  accredited 
investors, unaccredited investors are not attractive investor candidates.  They 
simply do not have significant capital to invest.  It would be impractical for 
the hedge fund promoter to allocate one of a limited number of investment 
slots  to  an  investor  with  only  very  modest  wealth.99  Further,  the 
sophistication inquiry that would have been necessary in the event of  a sale to 
an unaccredited investor is unnecessary in the case of accredited investors.
IOO 
And the accredited investor group includes many entities as well, subject to a 
general  $5  million asset test.101  In addition,  certain  individuals who have 
managerial  type  authority  with  respect  to  the  issuer  also  are  accredited 
investors,102  as  their relationship to  the  issuer would render any disclosure 
unnecessary, but those investors are more suitable for section 3c7 funds since 
they also may invest in section 3c7 qualified purchaser funds.10
3  Moreover, 
investment adviser regulations  prohibit the  investment  adviser  to the  fund 
from charging investors who are not "qualified clients" a performance fee. 104 
In the  case of an individual,  a qualified client has  at  least $1.5  million in 
assets.105 
placement memorandum describing and providing other information concerning the hedge 
fund offering, even if  the fund is selling only to accredited investors. 
95  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.  119, 125 (1953) (holding that sale of shares to rank: 
and file employees was a public offering not a private placement). 
96 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I) (2006); see discussion infra in text accompanying note 109. 
97  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2006). 
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2006). 
99  One million dollars is not today what is  was when the SEC promulgated Securities Act 
Rule 501(a)(5) in 1982. 
Revision of  Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers 
and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg.  11,251 (Mar.  16,  1982) (effective Apr.  15, 1982).  The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average was under 3000 in 1986 and reached 6000 in 1996.  Moreover, net worth 
includes the value of  the equity in one's owner occupied residence. 
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(h)(2)(ii) (2006). 
101  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(I), (3), (7) (2006). 
102 Securities Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2006). 
103 See discussion of Knowledgable Employees in section 3c7 funds that otherwise have only 
j\,.ua1ified purchasers as investors infra in text accompanying note 151. 
Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2006); see discussion infra Part 3. 
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A  recently  proposed  rule  change  would  redefine  individual  accredited 
investors for purposes of hedge funds  and similar pooled, but unregistered, 
investment  vehicles.  Rather than  income  or  net  worth  requirements,  that 
proposal would classify an individual or the individual and his or her spouse 
as an accredited investor onl~ if the individual or married couple has at least 
$2.5 million of investments.!  6  Unlike the accredited investor defmition with 
respect to which minimum asset requirements remained unchanged for many 
years,  the  minimum investment amount under the proposed regulation will 
adjust automatically to take account of  inflation.!07 
B.  Section 3c1 Funds; Integration 
Until  1997  when  Congress  authorized  section  3c7  funds,'oS  hedge 
funds failed to meet the investment company definition by limiting themselves 
to one hundred United States citizens or residents as  investors. 109  Investors 
who or which were neither citizens of nor resident in the United States were 
not counted toward the one hundred limit,  as  the Investment Company Act, 
like the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, does not protect or regulate the 
activities  of non-U.S.  persons  except insofar as  their activities  affect  U.S. 
persons or U.S. markets.110 
Although  accredited  investors  do  not  count  toward  the  thirty-five 
purchaser limit for private placements, they do count toward the one hundred 
owner  limit  for  exemption  from  the  definition  of investment  company 
applicable to section 3cl funds.
lll The rule for counting entities as beneficial 
owners has changed twice to make it more accommodating for hedge funds.
112 
Unlike  registered  investment  companies  that  may  make  only  very  limited 
investments  in other investment  companies,113  hedge  funds  may invest  in 
106  17 C.F.R. § 230.216 (2007 proposed) and proposed rule 509, 17 C.F.R. § 230.509 (2007 
proposed), promulgated in SEC Release 33-8766, supra note 21.  The proposed regulation 
includes a definition of investments and excludes the current investment in the fund from the 
computation.  Compare the investment amouot based classification of  the qualified purchaser 
definitions for section 3(  c  )(7) funds infra text accompany note 139. 
107 Id. 
108 See discussion of  section 3c7 funds that have only qualified purchasers as investors infra in 
text accompanying note 135. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I) (2006). 
110 Regulation S uoder § 5 of  the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-1001 (2006). 
111  Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I) (2006).  In measuring the cap of  one 
huodred beneficial owners, the promoter or general partoer is a beneficial owner, so that the 
fund in fact may admit only ninety-nine investors. 
112 Id.  § 80a-3(  c)(1 )(A). 
113 Id § 80a-12(d)(I) prohibits investment companies (and their controlled affiliates) from 
acquiring (i) more than 3 per centom of  the total outstanding voting stock of  another 
investment company; (ii) securities issued by another investment company having an 
aggregate value in excess of5 per centom of  the value of  the total assets of  the acquiring 
company; or (iii) securities issued by all other investment companies in which it invests 
having an aggregate value in excess of  10 per centum of  the value of  the total assets of  the Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  337 
other hedge funds.  Currently, each entity that owns less than ten percent of 
the voting interests  in a fund and each operating,  as  opposed to  investing, 
entity without regard to investment size counts as a single investor.  However, 
all the securities owners in the investor entity are deemed beneficial owners of 
the hedge  fund  in which the entity invests if the investor entity owns  ten 
percent or more of the voting interests  in the hedge  fund  and the  investor 
entity is an investment company or would be an investment company but for 
the exemptions for section 3cl and section 3c7 funds.
ll4  As a result, hedge 
funds investing in a diversified portfolio of  other hedge funds
1l5 count as only 
a single investor in each fund  so  long as  diversification limits the investor 
fund to less than ten percent of each fund in which it invests.  On the other 
hand, the rule prevents layering of section 3cl funds by admitting different 
investor groups into separate funds but having the separate funds invest all or 
most of  their its assets into a single fund that conducts the group's investment 
activities.  This article refers to such groups as "master-feeder" structuresY6 
Master-feeder  structures  also  raise  integration  issues  that  would  cause 
multiple hedge fund offerings to be treated as a single offering.  117 
In its  earlier  manifestation,  the  security  holders  in any  entity  that 
owned ten percent or more  of the  outstanding voting securities  of a  fund 
counted as beneficial owners of the fund,  even if the investment represented 
only a  small  investment for  a  large  company.  118  In that earlier form,  the 
provision  made  it difficult  for  new  funds  with limited  investor  capital  to 
acquiring company.  This restriction is explained in § I (b) of  the Investment Company Act as 
a pyramiding problem:  "(4) when the control of  investment companies is unduly concentrated 
through pyramiding or inequitable methods of  control, or is inequitably distributed ....  " 
Nevertheless, with appropriate safeguards for governance, the SEC often grants no-action 
relief  for master-feeder structures for registered investment companies.  Man-Glenwood 
Lexington TEl, LLC and Man-Glenwood Lexington TEl, LDC, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
597 (SEC No-Act. 2004). 
114 Id  This article refers to funds exempt under Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(7)  (2006)  as  "section  3(c)(7)  funds."  See  infra  text  accompanying  note  135  for 
discussion of  requirements for § 3(c)(7) funds. 
115  Often industry participants refer to such funds as a fund of funds, a fund structure that is 
not  generally  available  to  registered  investment  companies,  supra  note  113,  unless  the 
investment company is sufficiently diversified that it owns no more than 3 percent of any 
other fund and limits its sales charge to  1.5 percent.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(I)(F).  The SEC 
grants no-action relief for other fund of  funds structures.  The France Growth Fund, Tnc., 2003 
SEC  No-Act.  LEXIS  624  (SEC  No-Act.  2003)  (no-action  relief  for  investment  in 
unregistered,  offshore funds).  The SEC also has proposed regulations to  permit funds  to 
invest temporary cash in money market funds.  Fund of Funds Investments, 68  FR 58226 
(October 8,  2003) (proposing a rule that allows unregistered funds  and registered funds to 
investment in money market funds in excess of  Investment Company Act § 80a  -12(  d) limits.) 
116 For a more extensive explanation of  master-feeder structures, see infra text accompanying 
note 157. 
117 See discussion infra text accompanying note 121. 
m  15  U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I)(A) (2006), as in effect before amendment by section 102 of the 
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capture  investments  from  large  corporations.  For example,  a  one  million 
dollar investment by a major manufacturing corporation might be less than 
one percent of the corporation's assets but more than ten percent of  the fund. 
In order to accommodate the fund industry, Congress liberalized the rule to a 
ten and ten test, so that a fund would have to look through the investor entity 
to its owners only if the entity met two conditions:  (i) the  investor entity 
owned ten percent or more of the fund and (ii) the aggregate amount of the 
investment and similar investments of the  entity represented ten percent or 
more of the investor entity's total assets. 119  The current provision retains the 
ten percent of the fund test, (i) above, but substitutes a less inclusive test for 
the  ten  percent  of assets  test,  (ii)  above.  Only  if the  investor  entity  is 
investment  company-like must the hedge  fund  include  the  owners  of the 
investor company as beneficial owners of  the fund.  The investor company is 
investment company-like if either investing is  its primary purpose or, if the 
company invests but investing is not a company's primary business purpose, 
only if its  securities  investments  exceed  forty  percent of the value  of its 
assets.120 
Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds were never retail products sold to all 
who might wish to  invest in the  market regardless  of wealth,121  since the 
minimum investment was so great.  The one hundred investor cap meant that 
the minimum investment unit for a hedge fund had to be substantial in order 
for  the assets in the  fund to generate adequate fees  to  enable managers to 
cover operating costs.  In 1996, for example, the average hedge fund investor, 
assuming only U.S. investors in the section 3cl fund, would have to have an 
investment unit of $5  million for the hedge fund to rival the average mutual 
fund  in assets  under management.122  Most hedge  funds,  however,  had a 
smaller amount of  assets under management than the average mutual fund. 
Managers could increase the number of  investors they admitted to the 
fund by marketing the fund to foreign investors.  Non-U.S. investors helped 
fill the investment gap as they are not beneficial owners for purposes of the 
119 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I)(A), before amendment by section 209(a) of  the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Title II, Investment Company Act Amendments of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
120 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(I)(C). 
121  Recently,  some promoters have marketed registered hedge funds  as a  retail product to 
"qualified investors," a  class of investors having  net worth of at least $1.5  million.  See 
discussion infra Part 3.  A proposed regulation modifying the definition of  accredited investor 
for  private  investment  vehicles  effectively  would  increase  the  minimum  net  worth 
requirement to  $2.5  million of investments  (adjusted for  inflation).  Supra  note  106  and 
accompanying text. 
122  INvESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INvESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3,9 (2005), 
available  at http://www.ici.orglpdfi.2005jactbook.pdfi.  (showing that  in  1996,  U.S.  some 
6,000+ mutual funds had over $3  trillion in assets.  In 2004, there were approximately 8,000 
active  funds  with  over  $8  trillion  in  assets.  On average,  in  1996,  a  mutual  fund  had 
approximately $500 million, in 2004 $1 billion under management). Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  339 
Investment Company Act. 123  The presence of foreign investors added to the 
hedge  fund  mystique.  Hedge  funds  therefore  became  vehicles  for  the 
international moneyed community.  Wealthy foreign investors were reluctant 
to expose themselves to even the remote possibility of becoming subject to 
United States jurisdiction of  any kind.  As a lFz"0up, they were especially eager 
to remain free from U.S. taxing jurisdiction. 24  Foreign investors shied from 
the  United  States limited partnerships hedge  fund promoters used for their 
United States  investors.  Unlike  corporations  that incur an entity level tax 
followed  by inclusion of distributions  in  the  incomes  of the  corporation's 
owners,125  partnerships  are  not taxable  on  their  income.  Rather  they  are 
transparent for tax purposes.  Their partners must include their shares of the 
partnership's income  in their separate tax  computations but there is  only a 
single tax at owner level. 126  Distributions from the partnership to the partners 
generally  incur  no  further  tax.127  Foreign  investors  eschewed  that  tax 
transparency  and  wished  to  remain  free  from  U.S.  taxing  jurisdiction. 
Promoters chose to base the funds they designed for their non-U.S. clients in 
low  tax  jurisdictions  that  have  minimally  intrusive  regulatory  systems. 
Caribbean and United Kingdom island jurisdictions competed for share of the 
investment company market. 128  While promoters frequently operated parallel 
funds, one a U.S. based partnership for U.S. investors and the other a foreign 
company for  non-U.S.  investors,  the  offshore  funds  did  not  exclude  U.S. 
investors.  Many hedge funds only operated as foreign companies that offered 
their securities in private placernents to U.S. investors.'29 
123  Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 375 (1997) 
(confunring that non-U.S. persons are neither beneficial owners for section 3(c)(I) funds nor 
need they be qualified purchasers for section 3(c)(7) funds), and compare supra note 110 for 
Regulation S governing offshore offerings. 
124 Because the U.S. is known for the broad reach of  its taxation, as it taxes its citizens and 
residents on their worldwide income, non-U.S. persons often become fearful of  getting 
trapped in the U.S. taxation web. 
125  See I.R.C.  §§  301-385 (2000) (governing taxation of corporations that are taxable under 
section 11). 
126 See id.  §  § 701-777.  Note that investment companies registered under the Investment 
Company Act may enj oy a modified form of  tax transparency by means of  a corporate 
deduction for dividends paid to shareholders under the regulated investment company rules. 
See id §§ 85l-860L.  For detail on the United States taxation of  registered investment 
companies, hedge funds and their owners, see infra Part 4. 
127 I.R.C. § 731 (2000). 
128 For example, a recent visit to the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority website, 
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/sectionlregulatoryframeworklsub/default.aspx?section=PD&id= 
666 discloses that some 2750 mutual funds (broadly defined under Cayman Island law to 
include private investment companies) are incorporated or registered (in order to be 
administered) in the Cayman Islands. 
129 For U.S. tax purposes most such funds were passive foreign investment companies (PFICs) 
although some formed as limited liability companies in a variety of  jurisdictions and qualified 
as U.S. transparent for tax purposes like partnerships.  See supra note 126 and accompanying 
text.  This followed adoption of  the so-called "check the box" regulations in late 1997.  See 340  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
While managers could offer several funds  in order to increase their capital 
under management, integration posed some risk to that strategy.130  Under the 
SEC's integration concept,  the  SEC  identifies  factors  it deems relevant in 
determining whether or not to treat two or more offerings as a single offering. 
The factors are:  ''whether (I) the different offerings are part of a single plan 
of fmancing, (2) the offerings involve issuance of  the same class of security, 
(3) the offerings are made at or about the same time,  (4) the same type of 
consideration is to be received, (5) the offerings are made for the same general 
purpose.
l3l  In addressing  the integration  question,  the  SEC  considers the 
same factors  relevant as  it does for integrating securities offerings and adds 
the additional and, possibly determining, factor: 
whether an interest in one  partnership  would be considered 
materially different from an interest in a second partnership by 
a  reasonable  investor  qualified  to  purchase  both,  and  that 
relevant to this consideration would be whether the partnership 
had the same investment objectives, the same types of  portfolio 
securities,  and,  particularly,  similar  portfolio  risk  return 
characteristics.  132 
If, for example, a promoter simultaneously marketed two funds with identical 
investment managers, investment purposes, and investor profiles, the SEC was 
and still is likely to consider the two funds to be a single fund with a single 
beneficial owner cap.  By tailoring the investment strategies and markets of 
the various funds under the promoter's management, promoters could prevent 
integration of  the separate funds for Investment Company Act purposes.  Thus 
a  fund  might  focus  its  activities  in debt instruments  rather than equities, 
specific  industries,  or  specific  regions  or  countries  in  order  to  avoid 
integration with other sponsored funds.  Differing investor profiles also might 
prevent integration of  funds.  In one no-action response, the SEC determined 
that it would not integrate a fund marketed to tax exempt investors with a fund 
marketed to  taxable investors  even though the  funds  would have identical 
portfolios and managers.133  The fund for the tax-exempt investors was based 
offshore  and,  in order to  prevent realization of debt  financed  income that 
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended 2006), that allowed most island jurisdiction 
companies to elect U.S. tax transparency as if  they were partnerships under subchapter K of 
the Code.  See LR.C. §§ 701-777; discussion infra Part 4. 
130 The SEC has not promulgated a regulation that specifies when it will deem two or more 
offerings to be a single offering.  Guidance on integration takes the form primarily of  no 
action letters that delineate facts and circumstances tests for integration. 
131 See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962). 
132 Santa Barbara Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2390, at *4-5 
(Mar. 8, 1983). 
133  Shoreline Fund, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 517, at *6 (Apr. 
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otherwise would be taxable to the tax exempt organizations,  operated as  an 
entity that was not transparent for United States income tax purposes.  134 
C.  Section 3c7 Funds (Qualified Purchaser Funds) 
Despite a sizable investor network that included both U.S.  and non-
U.S.  investors,  the  hedge  fund  industry  continued  to  lobby  Congress  to 
liberalize the one hundred investor limitation.  In 1996, the industry's efforts 
enjoyed success as Congress not only diminished the breadth of the investor 
company look-through for section 3cl funds,135 but also effectively removed 
the  one  hundred beneficial owner barrier to the growth of the  hedge  fund 
industry  with  section  3c7  funds.  As  Regulation  D  permitted  sales  to  an 
unlimited  number  of "wealthy,"  accredited  investors  because  the  SEC 
concluded that such investors did not need the full protection of  the securities 
laws, so Congress defmed a similar new category of  purchaser of  interests in 
investment  pools  who  did  not  need  the  protections  of the  Investment 
Company Act.  Differences between the underlying regulatory rhilosophies of 
the  Securities  Act  and  the  Investment  Company Act  aside,  36  reasons  for 
exempting  offerings  to  accredited  investors  from  registration  requirements 
under the Securities Act were valid for the Investment Company Act as well. 
Truly wealthy folk do not need protection.  Wealth suggested that the investor 
had the following three characteristics:  (i) the ability to bear the loss from 
unsuccessful, high risk investments, (ii) the sophistication to understand the 
investment opportunity and evaluate its risks and (iii) the bargaining power to 
ask questions and receive answers.137  How much wealth suffices to raise the 
presumption that the investor has the characteristics that eliminate the need for 
various protections differs from ordinary securities investments to investment 
company investments - possibly because unregistered investment companies 
generally incur significant debt. 
Qualified r,urchasers are the accredited investors  138  of the investment 
company world. 
1 
9  The  qualified  purchaser  definition  uses  a  $5  million 
threshold for  the  exemptions it offers.  The definition departs  further from 
Regulation D by working from investments, other than the investment in the 
134 I.R.C. § 514; see infra Part 4 for discussion of  the treatment of debt financed income for 
tax exempts. 
135 See text accompanying supra note 111. 
136 See discussion supra in text accompanying note 59. 
137 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 246 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953) (holding that not all employees 
are qualified as private placement purchasers of  their employer's securities and establishing 
standards of  (i) information access, (ii) ability to ask questions and receive answers and (iii) 
wherewithal to bear the risk of  loss as determinants of  individuals to whom non  -public 
offerings ofsecurities may be made). 
138  Regulation D  under the  Securities Act,  17  C.F.R.  § 230.501(a)  (2006);  see supra text 
accompanying note 97. 
139 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006). 342  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
hedge  fund,14O  as  its base rather than aggregate  assets  under Regulation D. 
Individuals  141  and  family  owned  entitiesl42  such  as  family  limited 
partnershipsl43  that  own  at  least  $5  million  in  investments  are  qualified 
purchasers.  The qualified purchaser definition also embraces an investment 
adviser who makes investments for qualified purchasers and who manages at 
least $25 million.  SimilarZ' entities that own and invest at least $25 million 
are  qualified  purchasers.  I  Without  regard  to  investor  numbers,  pooled 
investment  funds  such  as  hedge  funds  owned  exclusively  by  qualified 
purchasers  are  exempt  from  registration  under  the  Investment  Compan4  Act. 145  In contrast with the Securities Act private placement safe harbor, I  6 
the  presence  of a  single  investor  not  a  qualified  purchaser  renders  the 
registration exemption inapplicable unless another exemption applies.147  The 
SEC may modify Regulation D in response to market conditions, as it recently 
proposed with its special accredited investor definition for investors in private 
investment vehicles,148  since Regulation D is an interpretation of a statutory 
principle rather than a statute itself.149  Conversely, the one hundred beneficial 
owner and qualified purchaser exemptions are statutory so  that their specific 
limitations are inflexible. 
At  the  same  time  as  introducing  section  3c7  funds  and  qualified 
purchasers,  Congress  directed  the  SEC  to  promulgate  regulations  to  allow 
investment in the fund by certain employees without jeopardizing the fund's 
exemption from the investment company definition.15o  By so doing, Congress 
freed up space in many section 3cl funds and permitted some otherwise non-
qualified  purchasers  to  become  investors  in  section  3c7  funds.  The 
knowledgeable employee exemption was not an altogether new concept.  It 
resembles  the  sophistication  requirement  under  Regulation  D.  Insiders 
140  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(b) (defining investments for purposes of determining whether a 
prospective investor is a qualified purchaser under the Investment Company Act).  Since the 
determination occurs before an investor makes the investment, the $5 million must exclude 
the intended investment in the section 3(c)(7) fond. 
141  15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i). 
142 !d. § 80a-2(a)(Sl)(A)(ii). 
143 It is interesting to note the hand of  the estate planning industry in the drafting of  the statute 
as estate planner frequently use family owned investment entities in order to capture discounts 
in estate value for federal estate tax purposes. 
144 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(iv). 
145Id. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
146 Regulation D of  Securities Act Rules.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006). 
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (2006) (reading in part, "[aJny issuer, the outstanding 
securities of  which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of  acquisition of  such 
securities, are qualified purchasers ....  " (emphasis added)). 
148 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.216, 230.509 (2007 proposed), supra note 106. 
149 Regulation D interprets § 77d(2) of  the Securities Act in light of  SEC practice and 
decisional law, including Ralston Purina, 246 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953). 
150 See National Securities Markets Improvements Act of  1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
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presumably have access to  information and understand the nature and extent 
of the  investment risk.  The  SEC  defined  the  exempted  employee  group 
functionally by emphasizing participation in the fund's investment activities. 
So  long as  the  employee's function  is  not ministerial  and the  employee's 
regular duties involve the investment activities of  the fund or the management 
company  on  behalf of other  funds,  the  employee  is  a  "Knowledgeable 
Employee"  whose  ownership  in  the  fund  is  disregarded.  151  Executives, 
directors,  general partners and advisory board members of the fund  or the 
management  company  are  also  "Knowledgeable  Employees"  under  the 
regulation. 152 
In order to ease the conversion of existing hedge funds to section 3c7 
hedge funds, the 1996 amendments to the Investment Company Act included 
two transitional rules.  One rule permitted existing funds to qualify as section 
3c7 funds while retaining investors who are not qualified purchasers but who 
invested in the fund on or before September 1, 1996.153  The fund may have as 
many as  one hundred such investors.154  At the time the fund converts to a 
qualified  purchaser  fund,  those  non-qualified  investors  must  have  the 
opportunity to redeem all or part of their interests and receive a payment in 
redemption equal to the investor's proportionate share of  the net value of the 
fund's assets in cash or in kind.155  The rule permitting existing non-qualified 
purchaser investors does not freeze the size of the non-qualified purchaser's 
investment.  Those investors who are part of  the pre-September 2, 1996 group 
may increase their investments in the fund,  decrease their investments and 
later increase them again without becoming excluded from that one hundred 
investor  groUp.156  On  the  other  hand,  investors  who  are  not  qualified 
purchasers may not invest directly in a qualified purchaser fund even if the 
fund has fewer than one hundred non-qualified purchaser owners but may be 
able to invest indirectly through a section 3c1  feeder fund. 
The second transitional rule facilitates the creation of master-feeder 
fund structures for section 3c7 funds, but not section 3c1  funds, by including 
funds within the qualified purchaser defmition.157  With respect to investment 
in section 3cl funds,  as  noted above/58  a fund that acquires ten percent or 
more of  a section 3cl fund becomes transparent so that all its owners become 
beneficial owners of  the section 3cl fund and may cause the section 3cl fund 
151  17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-S(a)(4) (2006). 
152 Id. 
153  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i) (2006). 
154 ld. § 80a-3(c)(7)(8). 
155Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(ii)«II). 
15. The statute defines the group as those who "acquired any portion of  the securities of  such 
issuer on or before September I, 1996." Id § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i)(1).  As the statute reads, an 
investor may remain part of  the permitted group even if  he or she redeems from the 
investment pool and later invests again. 
157 Id.  § 80a-2(a)(SI)(C). 
158 Supra note 116 and accompanying text. 344  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
to have more than one hundred beneficial owners.
1S9  On the other hand, a 
section 3cl fund may itself become a qualified purchaser when it invests in a 
section 3c7 fund - even if  it invests all or most of  its assets in the section 3c7 
fund. 160  Provided that all  beneficial  owners  of the  section 3cl fund who 
acquired interests before May 1,  1996 consent to its treatment as a qualified 
purchaser
161  and the fund has investments of at least $25 million, the existing 
section 3c1  fund becomes a qualified purchaser. 162  As a qualified purchaser, 
it may invest in another fund restricted to qualified purchasers. 
Whether or not Congress intended the result,  a fund that becomes a 
qualified purchaser under this election may accept new investors who are not 
qualified purchasers so long as it continues to  qualify for its exemption as a 
section 3c1  fund.  Accordingly, a fund that has at least $25 million in assets 
and that may not accept new non-qualified purchaser investors if it converts 
to  a  qualified purchaser fund  163  gains  the  ability to  accept  such  investors, 
subject to its one hundred beneficial owner limit, by becoming a feeder to a 
new section 3c7 fund.  New qualified purchasers would buy interests in the 
master fund  and new non-qualified purchasers  enter the  section 3c1  fund 
provided it has space under its one hundred investor limitation.  Furthermore, 
if the section 3cl fund is  full,  it might move qualified purchaser investors, 
who occupy beneficial owner slots in section 3cl funds, to  direct investment 
in the section 3c7 master fund and free up space in the section 3cl fund for 
additional non-qualified purchaser investors. 
After the 1996 amendments,l64 hedge funds groupings became better-
defmed.  A fund group would have a master fund that would do all or most 
investing for the group and two or more feeder funds  that would invest all 
their assets in the master fund.  The master fund would be either a limited 
partnership or limited liability company formed under the laws of one of the 
states of  the U.S., often Delaware.  Alternatively, the master fund could be an 
entity based in an offshore jurisdiction that elects to be taxed as a partnership 
for U.S.  tax purposes so  that the entity allocates prof:0rtional shares of the 
fund's income to U.S. investors for U.S. tax purposes. 
1 
5  In the case of  a U.S. 
entity hedge fund, an entity that the investment manager controls would be the 
general partner of the limited partnership  or the managing member of the 
limited liability company, so that the manager may receive an allocation of  the 
fund's profitS.
166  One of the  feeder funds  that invests all its  assets  in the 
159Id. § 80a-3(c)(I)(A). 
160 ld. § 80a-2(a)(51)(C). 
161 Id. 
162Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(iv). 
163 Supra in text accompanying and following note 156. 
164 Investment Company Act Amendments of  1996, supra note 118. 
165  Treasury Reg. § 301.7701-3 (allowing various foreign eligible entities to elect partnership 
tax treatment under subchapter K of  the Code); see discussion infra Part 4. 
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master  fund  might  be  a  section  3c1  fund  for  non-qualified  purchaser-
investors.  Like the master fund, it also would be either a limited partnership 
or limited liability company formed under u.s. law or an entity based in an 
offshore jurisdiction that  elects  to  be  taxed  as  a  partnership  for  U.S.  tax 
purposes.  Its  general  partner  or managing  member  is  an  entity  that  the 
investment manager controls.  Another feeder fund might be an offshore fund 
that does  not elect to  be taxed as  a partnership  for u.s.  tax  purposes  for 
foreign investors.  The same or another offshore fund that similarly is not U.S. 
income  tax  transparent  would  accommodate  u.s.  tax  exempt  investors, 
including,  subject  to  plan  asset  concerns,  pension  and  profit  sharing 
accounts.  167 
Section 3c7 funds have to register under the Exchange Act if  they have 
500 or more investors.168  Unlike registration under the Investment Company 
Act that limits use of  leverage and capture of  incentive fees for the investment 
adviser,  the Exchange Act does not restrict the activities of the fund  or its 
advisers.  Registration under the Exchange Act does  impose reporting and 
public  disclosure  burdens  on  the  fund  and  its  advisers  concerning  its 
organization, fmancial structure, contracts and advisers.169  The Exchange Act 
also requires registered issuers to report current information annually or more 
frequently.170  Most hedge fund managers seek to avoid registration under the 
Exchange Act by limiting the overall investor count to 499. 
III.  HEDGE FuND ADVISERS AND INCENTIVE FEES 
Investment strategies,  leverage,  and compliance burdens are  not the 
only reasons that hedge  fund managers  seek to avoid registering the funds 
they manage.  Also management fee restrictions are a key motivator.  171  While 
registration is an annoyance, the investment company itself bears the cost of 
reporting and compliance.  Most sizable hedge funds provide their investors 
audited financial statements in any event 172 and funds that are transparent for 
U.S.  tax  ~urposes  must  provide  investors  necessary  tax  reporting 
information.  73  With limited exceptions, registration precludes the manager 
,.7 Supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
168 Securities Exchange Act of  1934, IS U.S.C. § 781(g) (2006). 
169 [d.  § 781(b). 
170Id.  § 78m. 
171  IS U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(I) (2006) (prohibiting registered investment advisers from entering 
into  fee  arrangements  that  include  a  share  of capital  gains),  discussed  irifra  in  text 
commencing with note 186. 
172 Increasingly, popu1ar offshore jurisdictions like the British Virgin Island now require 
annual audits for hedge funds existing or administered under their laws. 
173 U.S. tax conduits file an annual retnrn and provide their investors K-Is while non-U.S. 
entities generally elect conduit taxation for their U.S. investors and provide the investors 
substitute K-ls to enable the investors to report their shares of  the fund's taxable income and 
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from  charginfi  fees  measured by the  advance  in the  net  asset  value  of the 
fund's assets.  74 
Fees  for  managers  of  hedge  funds  customarily  consist  of  a 
combination of  asset-based fees and result fees.
175  The manager may receive 
a fixed percentage - generally not more than one to two percent annually, 
with two  percent becoming the  model - of the assets  under management 
without regard to investment success,  and  an  additional amount equal  to  a 
percentage of the increase in the value of the assets under management -
generally  ten  to  twenty  percent  - with  twenty  percent  probably  most 
common.
176  Ordinarily,  in  master-feeder  fund  structures,  the  investment 
manager charges fees  only at one  fund  level so that an investor in a feeder 
fund does not pay fees directly for the feeder fund and indirectly for the feeder 
fund's investment in the master fund.  Similarly, hedge funds  that invest in 
other hedge  funds 177  charge smaller fees  than do direct investment funds in 
order to  limit,  but  not  eliminate,  the  multiple  fees  that  an  investor bears 
through the  fund  layers.  As  explained in the  following paragraphs, hedge 
funds sometimes compute fees separately for each investor account in order to 
(i)  facilitate  differing  fee  schedules  for  some  investors,  (ii)  measure 
compensation  for  referring  brokers  and  investment  advisers  for  capital 
invested, and (iii) coordinate correctly with floor-based - "high water mark" 
- accounting for incentive fees. 
Fees are negotiable, so that an offering memorandum for a hedge fund 
is likely to reserve the power for the investment manager to modify the stated 
fees  for some investors.  In order to avoid confrontation with the bulk of the 
fund's investors, hedge fund managers tend to contract separately for such fee 
arrangements and do  not disclose their details to  other investors.  Investors 
making very large investments or investment advisers placing capital in the 
hedge fund for several investors may have the necessary bargaining power to 
negotiate  more  favorable  fees.  Brokers  (and  some  advisers),  who  sell 
investments in the fund to their clients, may receive a continuing share of the 
fees the client pays to the fund.  For example, a broker bringing a $1  million 
174  15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1).  Note, however, that advisers to registered investment companies 
may contract to receive an asset based fee that increases or decreases ''proportionately with 
the investment performance ... in relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of 
securities prices ....  "  15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2).  Those fees, generally fulcrum fees, would be 
available  to  managers of mutual  funds  that beat the  Standard and Poor's 500 Index,  for 
example. 
175 Nomenclature and tax structure of  the fees varies.  Performance, incentive or result fees 
may take the form of  an allocation of  the hedge fund's profit in order to capture favorable tax 
characteristics, specifically long-term capital gain for the investment manager. 
176 These percentages vary considerably.  Since hedge funds are not registered investment 
companies, ouly the marketplace for investment capital and competition among managers 
limits fees. 
177 So-called "funds of  funds."  See supra note 115 and acccmpanying text. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  347 
investment to a fund might receive ten to twenty basis points
l78 annually from 
the asset-based fee (so $1  - 2,000 the first year based on a one percent asset 
management fee of $10,000) and an additional 5 percent of the incentive fee 
(another $1000 based upon a twenty percent incentive fee of $20,000 from a 
$100,000 increase in the account value). 179 
Fund managers frequently look to the asset-based fee for their day-to-
day operating expenses and the incentive fee as their source of  profit.  Rarely 
do  fund  managers return any portion of incentive  fees  they have  collected 
previously when assets  decline in value following an incentive fee.  Rather 
managers agree to claim subsequent incentive fees only when the value of  the 
investor's interest exceeds the incentive fee floor or "high water mark."  The 
floor is the highest value of that investor's interest upon which the manager 
previously  collected  an  incentive  fee.  This  floor  computational  method 
prevents  the  manager  from  collecting  multiple  incentive  fees  on  cyclical 
increases and decreases in value in volatile markets.  The floor, however, does 
not preclude retention of fees attributable to aberrant market spikes since the 
value of  an investor's account is the investor's share of  the net asset value of 
the fund without regard to whether the fund has realized any gain by disposing 
of positions.  As is the case with mutual funds that determine daily value by 
marking their positions to market at market close each day, hedge funds mark 
their positions to market on each fee computation date in order to be able to 
compute the fee.
180 
To illustrate this principle:  if  the incentive fee is 10% of  increase in an 
investor's account value during an  accounting period and,  due  to  a market 
spike  on  the  hedge  fund's  positions,  the  value  of the  investor's  interest 
increases from $10 to $50, the manager will collect an incentive fee of  $4, that 
is 10% of  the $40 increase.  When the value of  the investor's account declines 
from the succeeding market correction to $20, the investment manager does 
not  return  any  part  of the  fee  even  though  a  refund  of $3  might  seem 
appropriate  - $30  of the  value  increase  not  adhering.  But  while  most 
managers do not refund the excess fee,  they agree not to collect any further 
incentive fee until the value of  the investor's interest exceeds the $50 floor. 18l 
To  oversimplify fund  accounting  for  the  illustration,  if one  assumes  each 
investor's account is separate, each investor has a separate floor.  An investor 
who withdraws all or part of her invested funds following a decline in value 
eliminates her floor burden for the investment manager.  For example, if the 
178 There are 100 basis points to each one percent 
179 No standard for these fee-sharing arrangements is readily identifiable but one may assume 
that there is similarity in fee  sharing among funds because brokers placing investments with 
several funds will compare arrangements and seek to capture similar and most favorable terms 
for all investments. 
180 See discussion infra at note 184 of  illiquid positions and their value. 
,., Since $4 of  the $50 is paid to the manager, some managers set the high water mark at post-
incentive fee value so that the high water mark in the example is $46 rather than $50. 348  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
investor in the above example redeemed one-half of  her account and received 
$15,  the  floor for the  remainder of the  account would be $25,  rather than 
$50.
182 
The floor method of  recapturing historical incentive fees for investors 
described in the previous paragraph generates somewhat perverse incentives 
for the investment manager.  Following a decline in value after incentive fees 
have  been  collected,  new  investors,  whose  floor  is  the  amount  invested, 
represent the investment manager's best opportunity to receive incentive fees 
in the future.  Following a significant decline in the value of  the fund's assets, 
the investment manager may concentrate its efforts on raising new money in 
order to  capture  future  incentive  fees  rather than  focusing  its  attention  on 
actively managing the existing portfolio to regain lost value.  The more radical 
the decline in value, the more likely the manager is to conclude that efforts to 
recapture  fund  value will be futile.  As occurred following  the  significant, 
broad market declines in 1998 and 1999, the burden of existing floors were a 
major factor in many investment managers' decision to liquidate some or all 
their hedge  funds  and return the remaining capital to the investors.  In that 
way,  the  managers  freed  up  their  time  and  resources  for  new  and  more 
profitable ventures. 183 
Even though a fund only permits redemptions aunually, the fund will 
pay fees to its manager more frequently, usually monthly.  Consequently, the 
fund marks it positions to market monthly in order to compute the fee.  With 
respect to traded securities, there is a market against which to measure value. 
As with mutual funds, hedge funds will value exchange traded securities at the 
day's close.  But hedge  funds  may not use  the  same  convention as  mutual 
funds for over the counter securities and may select asked prices in order to 
benefit  the  manager.  Nevertheless,  funds  predominately  seem  to  use  an 
average  of bid  and  asked.  llliquid  positions  cause  problems  for  fee 
collection.
184  Some managers will collect an asset fee  based upon cost and 
defer  any  performance  fee  until  sale,  occasionally  requiring  a  larger 
performance fee  for illiquid positions than for  liquid securities.  Other fund 
documents  will permit managers  to  estimate  the  value  of the  illiquids  and 
collect fees accordingly.  In the case of funds that hold illiquid securities only, 
managers  invariably  collect  an  asset-based  fee  measured  most  often  by 
invested capital and defer collection of any performance fee  until the  fund 
disposes of  its positions. 
182 Or $23.  See note 181. 
103 Managers terminating hedge funds because of  floors may have found it more difficult than 
earlier to raise capital for their next venture or a new hedge fund.  Interestingly, hedge fund 
investors seem to be rather forgiving of  loss in value due to broad market declines that seem 
to  defY  active  portfolio  management.  As  loss  in value  is  a  function of unusual market 
conditions, the investors often are willing to invest with the same manager again. 
184 See discussion of  side pockets for illiquid positions supra in paragraph preceding note 34. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  349 
A.  Incentive Fee Exemptions and  Registered Advisers 
The opportunity to capture substantial compensation through incentive 
fees may help to attract high quality and creative investment managers to the 
hedge  fund  industry.  Those  managers  jealously  guard  against  any  fund 
structure  that  might  deprive  them  of their ability to  claim  incentive  fees. 
Historically,  the  requirement  to  register  the  fund  under  the  Investment 
Company Act effectively prevented the investment advisor from entering into 
a management contract with the  fund  or any other client that involved the 
payment of a result fee  or similar  arran~ement for the payment of incentive 
compensation.185  Investment  advisers I 6  generally must register under the 
Advisers Act. 187  With certain exceptions relating primarily to the wealth of 
the investors to whom or which the adviser renders investment advice,I88 the 
Advisers Act prohibits registered and registration required investment advisers 
from  contracting  to  receive  com/i:ensation  that  includes  a  portion  of the 
investment gains  of their clients.  9  However,  investment  advisers  having 
fewer  than  fifteen  advisory  clients  (and not holding themselves  out to the 
public generally as investment advisers) are exempt from registrationl90 unless 
one or more of  the clients is an investment company. 191 
Historically,  investment  advisers  to  section 3cl  funds  relied on the 
fewer than fifteen client exemy.tion  from  investment adviser registration in 
order to capture incentive fees.  92  The advisers limited the number of funds 
they advised to fourteen, treating each advised fund,  and not the underlying 
owners of  the fund, as a single client.193  Although a section 3cl fund was not 
an  investment company under the  Advisers  Act,I94  it was  a client,  and no 
general exception to the restriction on incentive fees  existed for section 3c1 
185 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a) (2006). 
186 [d.  § 80b-2(a)(1l)(  defining term "investment adviser"  broadly to encompass any person 
"who, for compensation, engages in the business of  advising others, ...  , as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of  investing in ...  securities." 
107  Id.  §  80b-3.  Investment advisers  who are subject to state regulation,  do not advise a 
registered investment company and have less than $25 million under management may not 
register under the Advisers Act.  Id § 80b-3(a). 
188 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2006); see discussion infra in text commencing 
with note 199. 
189 [d.  § 275.205(a)(I) prohibits investment advisory contracts that provide "for compensation 
to the investment adviser on the basis of  a share of  capital gains upon or capital appreciation 
of  the funds or any portion of  the funds of  the client. ..  " 
190 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)(3) (2006). 
191 Id.  § 80b-2(a)(12) incorporates the definition of  investment company under the Investment 
Company Act, that is, a company required to be registered under the Investment Company 
Act.  Id § 80b-2(a)(12). 
192 Id.  § 80b-2(a)(3). 
193  Advisers Act Rule,  15  C.F.R.  § 275.203(b)(3)-I(a)(2) (2006) (treating entity as  single 
client if  advisor renders advice to entity based on entity's investment objectives). 
194 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(12). 350  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
funds. 195  Incentive  fees  were not a problem for  section 3c7  funds,  as  an 
express  statutory  exemption  permits  incentive  arrangements  for  those 
funds.196  After 1996, a registered investment adviser (with or without more 
than fourteen advisory clients) could avoid the incentive fee limit by charging 
the incentive fee at the section 3c7 master fund level only.  Similarly, offshore 
funds that do not have U.S. residents as beneficial owners are exempt from the 
incentive fee 1imit.
197 
B.  Registered  Hedge Funds; Qualified Clients 
Some hedge funds began to resemble the more retail mutual funds as 
early as 1985 when the SEC, exercising its rn1emaking authority,198 permitted 
incentive fee  contracts for moderately wealthy investors.  199  Under the new 
rule, registered investment advisers were permitted to enter into incentive fee 
arrangements with clients who had a minimum investment with the registered 
adviser of  $500,000 or $1 million of  net worth.200  In the case ofa private201  or 
registered investment company,202 the exception to the incentive fee limitation 
applied only if all the owners of the company met the $1  million net asset 
standard.203  The  1985  rule  imposed  a  one-year  minimum  investment 
requirement  for  incentive  fees  and restricted the  computational method to 
include  unrealized  losses  whenever unrealized  gains  were  included.204  In 
addition,  the  rule  mandated  sEecific  disclosures205 and  imposed  an  arm's 
length standard on the contract.  06 
195 Id.  § 80b-5(a). 
196 !d. § 80b-5(b)(4). 
197 Id.  § 80b-5(b  )(5). 
198 Jd.  § 80b-5(e). 
199  The SEC promulgated Advisers Act Rule 205-3  in Release No. 1A 996, Exemption To 
Allow Registered Investment Advisers to Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of  Capital Gains 
Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client's Account.  Investment Company Act Release No. 
996, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,556 (Nov. 26, 1985). 
200 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. 275.205-3(b  )(1 )(1985).  The 1985 definition overlapped the 
accredited investor definition for individuals under Securities Act Rule 501 (a)(  5), supra note 
97, and accompanying text, with respect to the asset test but did not include the alternative 
income test of  Securities Act Rule § 501(a)(6).  For companies, however, the $1 million net 
asset test was far less demanding than the $5 million test for accredited investors.  Securities 
Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 501(a)(3) (2006). 
201  While section 3(c)(I) funds limited to 100 investors were not investment companies under 
the Investment Company Act,  absent an exemption,  Advisers  Act section 205  prevented 
registered investment advisers from charging incentive fees even to those funds. 
202 Registration of a fund under Investment Company Act § 8 permitted sale of interests to 
more than 100 investors, a product suitable for retail. 
203 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b)(2) (1985). 
204 Id.  § 275.205-3(c) (1985). 
205 !d. § 275.205-3(d) (1985). 
206  [d.  § 275.205-3(e) (1985) (requiring adviser believe contract to represent arm's length 
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The  SEC  modified  the  incentive  fee  rule  substantially  in  1998, 
tightening the  investor  qualifications  but  removing  the  various  contractual 
restrictions.207  Instead of  the $1 million net asset test, the revised rule defined 
"qualified clients" to whom a registered advisor might charge an incentive fee 
to  those clients who  either have $750,000 under the adviser's management, 
have  net  assets  of  $1.5  million,  are  qualified  purchasers208  or  are 
knowledgeable  employees  of the  investment  adviser,  that is  certain of the 
investment adviser's insiders - managers, officers, discretionary traders, for 
example.209  The SEC explained in its issuing release that the increase from $1 
million to  $1.5  reflects  adjustment for  inflation?10  The  1998  revisions  no 
longer required that all investors in a fund that entered into an incentive fee 
contract be qualified clients, so  lon~ as those who were not qualified clients 
were not subject to the incentive fee.  11 
Although  statistics  on the  volume  of qualified  client funds  are  not 
available  separately  from  general  statistics  on  registered  investment 
companies,  it is  likely that the  number of registered investment companies 
charging incentive fees  and marketed to  qualified clients grew rapidly after 
1998.  Unlike section 3cl and 3c7 funds that are exempt from registration,212 
registered funds  may not trade securities short unless the trades are covered 
with the  fund's  own portfolio.
213  Similarly,  leveraging  is  not an  available 
investment strategy as  all  re~istered funds  must have three hundred percent 
asset coverage for their debt.  14  While some participants in the industry refer 
to  qualified client funds  as  registered  hedge  funds,  those  funds  do  not  fit 
cleanly within  a  hedge  fund  definition.  They resemble  hedge  funds  with 
respect to advisory fees  and tend to engage in a broader and riskier array of 
trading strategies than do mutual funds generally but the resemblance may end 
207 Exemption To Allow Investment Advisers To Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of  Capital 
Gains Upon or Capital Appreciation ofa Client's Account Release No. TA-1731, 63 Fed. Reg. 
39,022 (July 21,1998). 
208  Including  qualified purchasers  may seems  unnecessary  as  anyone  with $5  million of 
investments is likely to have net worth of  at least $1.5 million but the $5 million investments 
requirement takes into account only acquisition indebtedness and not other indebtedness of 
the qualified purchaser. 
209 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(I) (1998). 
210 Part IT.B.l  of  Advisers Act Release No. IA-1731, notes that 1 million 1985 dollars was 
approximately the same as 1.5 million 1998 dollars.  The SEC, however, has not increased the 
$1 million definition for accredited investor commensurately.  Securities Act Rille, 17 C.F  .R. 
§ 230.501(a)(5) (2006); supra note 207.  And note the proposed change to the accredited 
investor  definition  for  investors  in private  investment  vehicles  that  includes  an  internal 
inflation adjustment.  17 C.F.R- §§ 230.216,230.509 (2007 proposed), supra note 106. 
211 Advisers Act Rille, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b) (1998). 
212 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). 
213  Guidelines  for the Preparation of Form N-8B-l, 37 Fed.  Reg.  12,790 (June  9,  1972) 
(treating  short sales  and  margin purchases  as  forms  of indebtedness  or senior securities 
subject to Investment Company Act section 18); supra note 67. 
214 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)(I)(A). 352  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
there.  Incentive fees may be a function of the reputation of the investment 
adviser  who  exacts  the  incentive  for  making  its  "stock picking"  services 
available to moderately wealthy investors. 
Emphasizing the growing importance of hedge funds  to  the efficient 
functioning of the U.S. capital markets and,  in light of that importance, the 
SEC's need to monitor funds  and collect  information  concerning  them  in 
order to protect the investing public, the SEC sought to modify exceptions to 
investment adviser registration to compel advisers to register and report many 
of their  activities  and  the  activities  of the  funds  they  advise.
215  The 
modification to the registration requirement was short lived.  The Court of 
Appeals of the D.C. circuit struck down the regulation within a few months 
following the date it became effective.
216  If  the regulation had been valid, it 
would have modified the  definition of client for purposes of the  fourteen-
client rule.217  Advisers to section 3cl and 3c7 funds would have counted the 
underlying owners of the section 3cl and 3c7 funds as clients, including the 
owners of any fund investing in the  client fund.
218  It is  unlikely that any 
hedge fund manager would continue to have fewer than fifteen clients under 
that revised rule.  With the rule now invalidated, entities, including limited 
partnerships, count as  a single client without regard to the number of their 
underlying owners, if the adviser renders advice with respect to the entity's 
investment objectives and not the entity's owners.
219 
IV.  TAXATION, RICs, REITs, AND HEDGE FuND STRUCTURE 
Mutual  funds  and real  estate  investment trusts  are  partially federal 
income tax transparent.
220  The entities elect to have their income taxed to 
their shareholders, rather than to the pooled investing entity itself.  Insofar as 
losses offset the entity's own income in a taxable year, tax transparency runs 
to losses as well as income, but transparency is not available for net loss as it 
is  for  net  gain.  Both  regulated  investment  companies  - mutual  funds 
215  Registration  Under  the  Advisers  Act  of Certain  Hedge  Fund  Advisers,  Investment 
Company Act Release No.  IA-2333, 69 Fed.  Reg.  72,054 (Dec.  10, 2004),  supra note  18. 
Registered adviser must adopt policies and procedures and designate a compliance officer. 
The  SEC  estimated  the  cost  to  register,  including  legal  and  accounting  fees,  to  be 
approximately $50,000.  Id at 72064 n. 112.  Registered investment advisers must complete a 
disclosure of concerning personnel, activities and assets under management, as well as their 
policies and procedures to assure compliance with the Advisers Act and the securities laws. 
See  17  C.F.R.  §  275.279.1  (2006);  Form  ADV,  available  at 
http://www.sec.gov/aboutlforms/formadv.pdf. 
216 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, supra note 19. 
217  15  U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006) (exempting advisors with fewer than fifteen clients from 
registering under Advisers Act). 
218 Advisers Act Ru1e, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006). 
219 Id.  § 275.203(a)(2). 
220 LR.C. § 851-55 (2006) (governing most registered investment pools). Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  353 
(RICsi21 - and real estate investment trusts (REITsi22 must distribute at least 
ninety percent of  their taxable income, other than capital gain income, to their 
shareholders annually in order to escape entity level tax on their incomes.223 
A corporate tax burdens all income, whether or not distributed, if the entity 
fails to distribute ninety percent of  its ordinary income.224  If  the entity passes 
the ninety percent test, the corporate tax reaches only that portion of income 
that the entity does not distribute to its shareholders.225  The entity-level tax 
mechanism  that protects  the investment entity from  the  corporate  tax  is  a 
deduction for dividends the entity pays to its shareholders.226 As such, RICs or 
REITs  may claim  no  dividends  paid  deduction  for  undistributed  income. 
Generally,  RICs  and  REITs  distribute  substantially  all  their  capital  gain 
income  and  the  remainder  of their  ordinary  income  to  secure  full  tax 
transparency with respect to income. 
The dividend to shareholders generally preserves the character of the 
income  to  the entity.  Capital gain dividends,  to the  extent of a RIC's or 
REIT's net capital  gain,227  are  long term  capital  gains  to  shareholders.228 
Dividends a RIC pays out of  ~ualifying dividends it receives are qualifying 
dividends  to  the shareholders2 
9  and exempt interest dividends  are  exempt 
interest income to the shareholders.23o  Moreover, dividends the entity pays 
after the close of  its taxable year revert to the taxable year, as  lon~  as the RIC 
or REIT declares the dividend before it timely files its tax return.  31  In order 
to avoid having to make actual cash distributions to all shareholders to capture 
221  Id.  § 851(a)  (defining regulated investment company to  include registered investment 
companies under Investment Company Act and other entities). 
222 Id.  § 856 (defining REITs). 
223  Jd.  §§ 852, 857 (2006). 
224  I.R.C.  §  852(b)(1)  imposes  a  corporate  tax  under  I.R.C.  §  11  for  RICs.  I.R.C.  § 
852(b)(2)(d) provides a deduction for dividends the RIC pays to its shareholders, and T.R.C.  § 
852(b)(3)(A),(B) imposes a corporate tax on the RIC's capital gain but provides a deduction 
for capital gain dividends the RIC pays to its shareholders.  I.R.C. § 857(b)(1), (2)(B) and (3) 
combined provide the same tax treatment for REITs. 
225 Id. 
226  Id  §§  852(b)(2)(D),  852(b)(3)(B)  (RIC  deductions  for  ordinary  and  capital  gain 
dividends);  Id.  §§  857(b)(2)(B),  857(b)(3)(B) (REIT deductions);  Id.  § 561  (defining the 
dividends paid deduction). 
227 Jd.  § 1222(11) (defining net capital gain as the excess of  net long term capital gain over net 
short term capital loss). 
228  Id.  §§  852(b)(3)(B),  857(b)(3)(B).  Note, however,  that net short term capital gain as 
defined in T.R.C.  § 1222(5) becomes an ordinary income dividend to the shareholders that is 
not a qualifying dividend. 
229  Id  §§  854(b)(I)(B),  857(c)(2).  Qualifying  dividends  under I.R.C.  §  1(h)(l1)(B) are 
dividends received that qualified for the reduced rate of  tax under I.R.C. § 1  (h)( 11). 
230 Id.  § 852(b  )(5)(B). 
231  Id.  §§  855, 858.  I.R.C. §860 permits a deficiency dividend and deduction to eliminate the 
entity level tax, but not the interest on any deficiency, if  there is an adjustment in tax liability 
from settlement with the Internal Revenue Service or court proceeding. 354  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
the dividends paid deduction,232 RICs and REITs offer dividend reinvestment 
programs  under  which  the  shareholder  may  elect  to  have  the  fund 
automatically reinvest dividends otherwise payable.  Reinvestment programs 
are simple, generally requiring only checking a box at the time of  investment 
for  a shareholder to participate.  As RICs  and REITs  generally offer daily 
liquidity, a shareholder may redeem all or part of  the shareholder's interest at 
any time to receive cash. 
Real estate mortgage investment conduits ("REMICs,,)233  and,  from 
1997 to 2004, fmancial  asset securitization investment trusts ("FASITs"i34 
facilitated pooling of various debt instruments by treating the holders of the 
interests as direct owners of the underlying asset of the entity.  Accordingly, 
income  of a  REMIC  or  continuing  F  ASIT  is  taxable to  the  holder of an 
interest as if  the REMIC or F  ASIT were a tax nothing.235 
While Congress has defmed specific, transparent tax regimes for RICs, 
REITs, REMICs, and FASITs, domestic hedge funds achieve federal income 
tax transparency by taking limited partnership form.236  Offshore hedge funds 
either elect partnership tax status for U.S. tax purposes237  or agree to provide 
sufficient information to enable their U.S. investors to pay tax currently on 
their  shares  of the  fund's  income  through  a  qualifying  electing  fund 
shareholder's election.
238  Alternatively, if  their U.S. investors are exclusively 
organizations that are exempt from federal income taxation,239 offshore hedge 
funds may elect where necessary to be associations taxable as corporations for 
U.S. purposes.240  The following paragraphs elaborate upon these choices. 
232 ld. § 561  defines dividends paid. 
233 ld.  §§ 860(a)-(g). 
234 I.R.C. §860(h)-(l) (1978), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.  No. 
108-357, § 835, 188 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
235  Compare disregarded entities such as qualified subchapter S subsidiaries under I.R.C.  § 
1361(b)(3)  and single  owner  limited  liability  companies  under Treas.  Reg.  §  301.7701-
3~)(1  )(ii), -3(b  )(2)(i)(C). 
23  All states provide for limited partoership entities.  Subchapter K of  the Code, I.R.C. §70 1-
77 (2006), governs the taxation of partoerships and other entities, including limited liability 
companies, that are taxed as partoerships under the Code. 
237  Treas.  Reg.  §  301.7701-3  (2006) (assigning partoership tax  status to various business 
entities and permitting entities classified as tax partoerships to elect corporate tax treatment 
and  some  entities  otherwise  classified  as  associations  taxable  as  corporations  to  elect 
~artnership tax status - commonly referred to as the "check-the-box" rule). 
38 T.R.C. § 1295 (2006) (providing for the election); ld.  § 1292 (2006) (defining the effect of 
the qualified electing fund election). 
23. ld. § 501(a). 
240 Treas.  Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (2006) classifies many foreign entities as corporations and 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (2006) presumptively classifies foreign entities as partoerships 
only when at least one member does not have limited liability.  Those partoership classified 
entities may elect to be associations taxable as corporations for U.S. tax purposes under Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(I) (2006). Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer 
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Investment partnerships, whether limited or general partnerships, are 
fully transparent for federal income tax purposes.241  Under the partnership tax 
rules,242  the  partnership  allocates  its  net  income or loss  and its  separately 
stated items of income and deduction among its partners243  according to the 
partnership agreement.244  Like ruCs and REITS, tax transparency preserves 
the character of  partnership tax items, as  the partners include their shares of 
those items in their individual income computation.245  Items such as capital 
gain,246  both long and short term,247  dividends,248  and tax exempt interesr49 
that are  taxed to  individuals  and  some  entities  at  a lower rate of tax than 
ordinary income retain their preferred tax character as they pass through the 
partnership  to  the  partners.  Unlike  ruCs  and  REITs,  transparency  for 
partnerships extends to losses as well, so that  J'artners may deduct their shares 
of net partnership  loss  and  capital  losses25  to  the  extent  of the  partner's 
adjusted basis in his or her partnership interest.  251 
Since hedge funds actively trade securities and other positions, rather 
than passively investing in and holding positions for appreciation, many funds 
report their 0gerating expenses as expenses from the active conduct of a trade 
or business.2  As ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses,253 rather 
than investment expenses,254  the investors' shares of those expenses are not 
241  LR.C.  § 7701(a)(2) (2006) (defining partnership and not distinguishing among general, 
limited and limited liability partnerships).  Liability sharing regulations under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1. 752-2(f)  (2006)  for  example,  treat  limited  and  general  partners  differently  from  one 
another. 
242 See supra note 236. 
243  A partnership computes its income in much the same manner as an individual.  I.R. C.  § 
703 (2006).  The partnership, however, separately states various items of  income or deduction 
that,  when  partners  with  differing  tax  characteristics  take  their  shares  into  account,  tax 
outcomes will differ.  I.R.C. § 702(a) (2006). 
244 T.R.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
2451.R.C. § 702(b), (c) (2006). 
246  Under I.R.C.  §  1  (h),  individuals pay a  lower rate of tax on long-term capital gain, as 
defined in I.R.C. § 1222(2), than they do on their ordinary income while corporations do not 
247 RIC and REIT distributions do not preserve the character of  short term capital gaio, supra 
note 228. 
24. Corporations may claim a dividends received deduction when they receive dividends from 
other corporations under LR.C.  § 243.  Individuals,  currently, pay a  lower than ordinary 
income rate of  tax on many dividends under T.R.C.  § 1(h)(1l).  T.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1l), 243 (2006). 
249 Id.  § 103 (exempting interest on state and local obligations from federal income tax). 
250Id. § 702(a). 
251  !d.  § 704(d) (limiting partner's deductible loss to partner's partnership interest adjusted 
basis but allowing unlimited carry forward of  any non-deductible loss). 
252  Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23  (1987) (holding that gambling constitutes a trade or 
business when the activity is sufficiently regular and businesslike).  Hedge funds managers 
distinguish the fund's activities from passive investing because of  the active manner in which 
they trade. 
253 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
254 ld. § 212. 356  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
subject to the 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions.255  As a result 
of this reporting position, a fund might allocate to an investor both long term 
capital gain and an ordinary deduction in the same year, representing the ideal 
tax combination of  income as long term capital gain and expenses as ordinary 
deductions.  However,  active  trading  means  short  holding  periods  for 
positions  and,  accordingly,  short- rather  than  long-term  capital  gain.  A 
special  tax  regime  governs  any  commodities  positions  the  hedge  fund 
holds,256  including regulated futures contracts, forward contracts, and certain 
equity options.  The statute requires the  fund to  determine the fair market 
value of those positions at the close of the taxable year under a procedure of 
''marking to market" and to include the unrealized gain or loss in the positions 
in the fund's  ~oss income, even though the fund has not sold or exchanged 
the positions.2 
7  Under that statute, that gain or loss is sixty percent long term 
capital gain and forty percent short term capital gain without regard to  the 
actual holding period of  the position.258 
Hedge  fund  managers  generally adopt  limited partnership  form  for 
their domestic funds and elect partnership tax status for their offshore funds 
that have taxable U.S.  persons as  investors.259  In addition to  enabling the 
managers  to  control  the  fund  by  restricting  the  voting  rights  of  the 
investors,260  limited  partnerships  and  offshore  companies  taxed  as 
partnerships  permit (i)  the  fund  to  have  multiple  classes  of interests  with 
different  fees  and  allocations  of income  and  (ii)  the  manager  to  receive 
performance  allocations  of the  partnership's  income  rather  than  fees.  In 
255 Id.  § 67 (limiting deductibility of  certain items to amount by which all such items exceed 
2% of  taxpayer's adjusted gross income).  The Internal Revenue Service may challenge this 
reporting position on deductibility but does not seem to have done so as yet.  On the other 
hand,  a  partnership that takes the position  that its  trading  activities  constitute  a  trade or 
business may find itse1funable to prevent reducing its basis in its assets under LR.C. § 743, as 
amended by § 833(b) of  the American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 188 
Stat. 1418 (2004), when there is a sale of  a partuership interest at a loss because an electing 
investment partuership can never have been engage in a trade or business.  LR.C. § 743(e)(6) 
(2006).  Rarely  do  hedge  fund  partuership  interests  trade,  however,  as  the  partuership 
generally redeems the  interest of a  departing partuer,  so  that the  opportunity to prevent 
reduction in basis is relatively insignificant.  The statute applicable to redemptions of  interests 
offers no comparable opportunity to prevent basis reduction.  Id § 734. 
256 LR.C. § 1256. 
257 Id  Generally, a taxpayer realizes and recognizes gain or loss and includes the gain or loss 
in gross  income  only  when the  taxpayer  sells  property or exchanges  property for  other 
property.  LR.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2006).  The author has argued elsewhere that the realization 
requirement embodied in T.R.C. § 1001 is a constitutional requirement so that T.R.C. § 1256 is 
unconstitutional.  Henry  Ordower,  Revisiting  Realization  - Accretion  Taxation,  the 
Constitution, Macomber, and  Mark to Market, 13 VIRGINIA TAX REv. I (1993). 
25. LR.C. § 1256(a) (2006). 
259 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2), (c). 
260  Limited partuers under the  revised uniform limited partuership act generally have very 
limited or no voting rights, while foreign companies may issue non-voting shares to investurs 
and voting shares to the manager. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  357 
addition,  offshore  companies  that make  the  U.S.  partnership  election may 
admit both U.S. and foreign investors, without providing information to the 
U.S. concerning the foreign investors.261 
The partnership agreement (or governing instrument in the case of the 
offshore  electing company)  controls the  allocations  of partnership  items  of 
income  and  deduction.262  Unless  the  allocations  do  not have  substantial 
economic effect,263 the allocations under the partnership agreement of  items of 
income  and  deductions  for  expenses  may  differ  from  partner  to  partner 
without regard to the partner's capital contribution to the partnership.  Profit 
allocations  increase  a  partner's  capital  account  balance  and  allocations  of 
deduction or loss  decrease a partner's capital account balance.  As  long as 
distributions of money will follow  capital account balances when a partner 
redeems  a  partnership  interest  and  when  the  partnership  terminates,  the 
allocation  has  the  necessary  economic  effect  to  meet  tax  requirements.264 
Investment partnerships like hedge funds customarily determine the values of 
their investment positions periodically, usually monthly, and allocate changes 
in value  from  the previous period among  the  partners.  Advance  in value 
increases  the  partners'  capital  accounts  and retreat  in  value  decreases  the 
partners'  capital accounts.  265  Allocations of tax inclusions and deductions 
that  might  differ  from  the  book  allocations  in  amount  follow  the  book 
allocations although hedge funds, if  permitted, may make a general mark-to-
market inclusion election, so that they may avoid disparity between book and 
tax allocations.266  The election may not be available to the many hedge funds 
261  Domestic partnerships must file Form 1065, partnership information return of income, to 
which it attaches a schedule K-l for each partner.  Foreign electing entities, on the other hand, 
need not  file  a  U.S.  partnership return but must provide to  their U.S.  owners,  the  same 
information those owners would have received on a domestic K-l so that they may correctly 
r;rort their shares of  the entity's tax items. 
26  l.R.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
263 l.R.C. § 704(b).  The intricate Treas. Reg. §1.704-1, -2 (2006) seeks to define and limit the 
concept of  substantial economic effect.  In the case of  a hedge fund, the income and expense 
allocations  define  the  amount of cash  that  the partner  ultimately  will  receive  from  the 
partnership and, therefore, have substantial economic effect. 
264 Treasury reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (2006).  The allocations also must be "substantial" under 
treasury reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), a somewhat more complex concept than economic effect.  To 
oversimplify the concept, if  the allocations are not arbitrary but are a function of  an economic, 
rather than pure tax driven arrange, the allocations meet the substantiality part of  the test. 
265  Treas. Reg.  § 1.704-I(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(iv) (2006) (allowing revaluations of the property of 
partnership  that  trade  securities,  commodities,  and other  related positions  like  derivative 
products according to industry accounting standards). 
266  I.R.C.  § 475(e)  (2006) permits taxpayers  that trade  securities to  elect mark to  market 
accounting under which they determine the fair market value of  their positions at the close of 
the taxable year and include the gain and loss in those positions in income as if  they had sold 
the positions for their fair market value at the close of  the taxable year. 358  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
that hold large numbers or value amounts of  illiquid ~ositions that they cannot 
mark to market with any siguificant level of  comfort.  67 
B.  Manager's Compensation in Partnerships 
Rather than receiving a cash payment or an interest in the partnership 
as  a  fee  that  would  be  taxable  as  ordinary  income  to  the  investment 
manager/general partner, the partnership allocates part of  its income and book 
gain to the general partner.  Specifically, as the partnership re-determines the 
value of its positions, in the case of a twenty percent performance share, for 
example, the partnership specially allocates twenty percent of  the book gain to 
the  general partner's  capital  account.  On the  other hand,  the  partnership 
allocates book losses  among the partners,  including the general partner, in 
proportion to the partners' capital account balances.  Accordingly, the general 
partner receives an allocation of twenty percent of profit but bears  only a 
proportional share ofloss. 
Since capital accounts determine how much cash a partner will receive 
on liquidation of the partnership,  the manager,  as  general  partner, has  an 
increasing share in the partnership's capital.  If  the manager wishes to convert 
that interest to cash, the manager may cause the partnership to redeem part of 
the manager's interest in the partnership.  Rather than the special allocation 
being an ordinary income fee to the manager, the allocation is made up of  the 
same types of  income as the partnership realizes, some or all of  which may be 
long-term capital  gain  and  dividends  that  may be  taxable  at  lower  than 
ordinary income rates in the hands of  the general partner.
268  General partners 
usually are themselves tax transparent entities - limited liability companies 
and S  corporations,  so  that the  general partner's share of the  hedge fund 
partnership's income is taxable to the general partner's individual owners.  As 
individuals the owners may capture the lower dividend and long term capital 
gain rates. 
For example, assume the fund has a general partner with a zero capital 
contribution and a twenty percent performance allocation and a limited partner 
who invests $100.  The partnership evaluates its positions at the close of  the 
month and determines that there is a gain of  $1 O.  The partnership allocates $2 
to the general partner who now has a  capital account of $2  and $8  to the 
limited partner who now has a capital account of  $108.  Since a liquidation of 
the partnership  following  the  allocation of that book gain for  $110 would 
result in a distribution of liquidation proceeds of $108 to the limited partner 
and  $2  to  the  general  Rartner,  the  allocation  has  economic  effect  for 
partnership tax purposes? 9  If no liquidation occurs and, in the next month, 
267  I.R.C.  § 475  is only available if the taxpayer can determine the value of its positions 
because of  an available trading market.  See discussion of  illiquid side pocket positions, supra 
in Part 1. 
268 Supra note 243 discussing I.R.C.§ l(h). 
269 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii). Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  359 
the partnership positions decline $10 in value, the partnership allocates 2/110 
of the loss or $0.18 to  the general partner and the remainder to  the limited 
partner  - $9.82.  Capital  account  balances  are  now  $1.82  and  $98.18 
respectively.  Capital accounts define the partners' proportional shares for the 
next month's allocation of further loss and deduction, as well as income until 
the  limited  partner's  capital  account  regains  the  performance  allocation 
floor.270  Unless the limited partner withdraws or the partnership liquidates, 
the  general partner will  receive  no  further performance  allocation until the 
limited partner's capital account reaches $108 again.  For example, if, in the 
third month,  the  partnership's positions  advance  $10  again,  the partnership 
would allocate the first $9.82 to the limited partner to restore the floor.  The 
remaining $0.82, the partnership would allocate $0.16 to the general partner 
(20%) and the remainder to the limited partner. 
The allocations that the previous paragraph describes are book, rather 
than tax, items.
271  The partnership allocates the increase in value based upon 
a book adjustment of its positions before it takes taxable income or loss into 
account.  Any corresponding taxable inclusion or deduction must await the 
disposition of the positions, the change in the value of which generated the 
special allocation and adjustments to the partners' capital account balances.  If 
in the first example, the partnership's year closed following the first $10 gain, 
and the partnership recognized $5  long term capital gain on its positions for 
the year, the partnership would allocate that taxable gain  $1  to  the  general 
partner  and  $4  to  the  limited  partner  in  order  to  eliminate  the  disparity 
between  book  and  tax  that  the  revaluation  of the  partnership's  positions 
created.  272  The  partnership  initially  would  allocate  all  its  ordinary  tax 
deductible expenses for the year to the limited partner until the general partner 
received its first  special allocation that gave  it a capital account.  Then the 
partnership  would allocate tax  items  between the partners  in proportion to 
those capital account balances. 273 
Taxation of the general partner who receives a performance allocation 
from hedge or f,rivate equity funds recently has become a topic of discussion 
in  the  press,2  4  among  members  of  Congress
275  and  in  the  academic 
270 See discussion of  the floor or "high water mark," supra Part 3 note 180 and accompanying 
text. 
271  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b  )(2)(iv) (2006) (providing rules for maintenance of  capital accounts 
under the regulations). 
272  Treas.  Reg.  §  1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(r)(4)(i)  (2006)  (applying  T.R.C.  §  704(c) principles to 
readjustments of  capital that create book-lax disparity). 
273  I.R.C. § 706(d) (requiring that partoerships must allocate income and loss to take changes 
in interests during the taxable year into account). 
274  Editorial:  Taxing  Private  Equity,  N.Y.  TIMEs,  Apr.  2,  2007,  available  at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2007/04/02/opinionl02monl.html (arguing  that the general partoer 
who receives a carried interest in private equity funds  should be taxable on the interest as 
ordinary income, rather than capital gain, and noting that Congress has begun to address the 360  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
literature.276  Those sources suggest that Congress may modify the Code to tax 
those performance allocations as ordinary compensation income, rather than a 
share of partnership income including capital gain.  As noted above,277  the 
partnership  currently  allocates  book  income,  including  unrealized  asset 
appreciation that is  not yet taxable  (and may never become  taxable  if the 
assets depreciate in value again before the partnership sells them), among all 
the  partners.  As  part of that book income  allocation,  the  general  partner 
receives  the  twenty percent performance  allocation.  When the partnership 
realizes  taxable  income  of all  types,  especially capital  gain,  and  from  all 
sources,  it allocates  that taxable  income  among  the  partners,  including  the 
general  partner,  according  to  the  partners'  distributive  shares.  Those 
distributive  shares  take  the  ~erformance allocation of book income  to  the 
general partner into account.2 
8 
The  recent  literature  argues  that  taxing  performance  allocations  as 
ordinary  compensation  income  is  appropriate  for  hedge  and private  equity 
fund  managers.z79  Taxing as  ordinary income, however,  will necessitate  a 
change  in  the  relatively  longstanding  rules  governing  the  receipt  of a 
partnership  profits  interest  for  services.28o  Those  rules  emanate  from  the 
government's  concession  on  timing  and  valuation  issues  following 
unsuccessful litigation in Campbell v.  Commissioner.281  While that decision 
concluded that the interest was taxable if subject to valuation, the court held 
that the interest had no value when the taxpayer received it. 282  The outcome 
of non-taxability allowed taxpayers in many cases, not limited to hedge and 
private equity funds,  to  convert what otherwise  would be ordinary income 
from their services into income from property, often capital gain.283 
issue.  The editorial implies, mistakenly, that the capital gain is  all long term taxable at a 
maximum 15% rate.). 
275 [d. 
276 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 
Colorado Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper Number 06-27 (Revised 
Mar.  11,2007) (referred to in the New York Time editorial supra note 274 and arguing that 
the current structore of  taxing partnership profits interests for services permits the conversion 
of income from human capital into capital gain and arguing that altering that tax treatment 
would be a compelling and justifiable tax change). 
277 Text accompanying supra notes 268-273. 
278 T.R.C. § 704(b). 
279 Fleischer, supra note 276. 
280 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (treating the receipt ofa profits interest for services as 
non-taxable  when  received,  unless  certain  exceptions  rendering  valuation  simple  and 
straightforward apply). 
2., 943 F.2d 815 (8
th Cir., 1991) (holding that the profits interest in a partnership the taxpayer 
received for services is not taxable because it has no ascertainable value). 
281 Id. 
283  I.R. C.  §  83  (governing  taxability of property,  including  a  partnership  interest,  that a 
taxpayer receives for services and fixing a single point in time for valuation and inclusion of 
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The concession in the revenue procedure284  produced a tax rule that 
was  administrable but theoretically unsound.285  Rather than investing in  a 
partnership with assets or money that had been taxed before the partner used 
that capital to  invest in the partnership,  as  other partners do,  partners who 
received  only  profits  interests  for  services  invest  with  untaxed  service 
income.286  A  change  in  the  rule  makes  sense.  Any  new  rule  may  be 
inconsistent with the general operation of  partnership taxation.  If  a new rule 
is consistent with other partnership tax rules, on the other hand, it will prove 
more complex in practice than the current discussion anticipates.  Receipt of 
the interest will attract a tax on the ordioary income from services equal to the 
value of the interest received.  Later, unless the new rule also restructures the 
partnership's allocations, the manager also  will be taxed on the  manager's 
share  of the underlying  partnership  income  as  the  partnership realizes  it -
effectively  taxing  the  income  from  the  same  partnership  source  twice.287 
Given Congress'  unwillingness to  enact legislation that diminishes benefits 
for hedge and private equity funds and their managers,288 the change in the tax 
rules may not find its way to the top of  the congressional agenda. 
C.  Tax  Exempt Investors,  Unrelated Business  Taxable  Income,  and 
Foreign Investors 
Among hedge fund investors are many u.s. tax-exempt organizations 
for  which hedge  fund  partnerships  do  not work quite  right.  Tax  exempt 
organizations, whether of  the charitable varieties289 or retirement plans,29o are 
generally  free  from  federal  income  taxation  on  their  investment  income. 
However, exempt organizations are taxable on any unrelated business income 
284 Rev. Proc. 93-27, supra note 280. 
285 Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Acbieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19, 
34-38  (1992)  (arguing  that  if valuation  is  impractical  upon  receipt  of the  interest,  the 
transaction should remain open for tax purposes and taxed as valuation becomes practical or 
as the partner receives payments).  And  Fleischer, supra note 276,  reviews  much of the 
extensive literature on the issue. 
286 Ordower, supra, note 285. 
287Id. at 38.  The second tax as the general partner receives a distributive share under I.R.C. § 
702 will increase the general partner's adjusted basis in the partnersbip interest (I.R.C. § 705) 
that will compensate for the second level of  tax through a smaller taxable gain or a taxable 
loss on disposition of  the partnership interest. 
288 See supra text following note 17. 
289 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (relating to charitable, educational, religious, etc. organizations that are 
~enerally exempt from federal income taxation). 
90  Pension  and  profit  sharing  plans  under  I.R.C.  §  401,  educational  and  charitable 
organization employee plans under I.R.C. § 457, and non-Roth individual retirement accounts 
under I.R.C. § 409 are generally exempt from federal income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a). 
Hedge funds generally monitor retirement plan investment in order to remain under the 25% 
plan asset limit,  lest the fund manager become a  fiduciary under ERISA.  Department of 
Labor Regulation, 29 C.F.R.  § 2510.3-101.  See Shartsis Friese, U.S. Regulation of Hedge 
Funds, supra note 38, at 249-265. 362  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
they may have.291  Debt-financed income is  unrelated business  income?92 
Income from  hed~e fund partnerships that borrow in order to  leverage their 
investment capital 93  is debt-financed income to the extent of  the borrowing. 
As with all  partnershi~s, the partnership's income retains its character in the 
hands of  its partners.2 
4  Accordingly, debt-financed income to the partnership 
retains that character as the partnership allocates it to the exempt organization. 
If it  invests  in  the  partnership,  a  tax  exempt  organization's  share  of the 
partnership's debt fmanced income would be subject to the unrelated business 
income tax. 
Hence  from  the  tax  exempt  investor's  perspective  a  corporate 
investment vehicle that is not transparent for federal income tax purposes is 
preferable to a partnership.  Neither dividends that the exempt organization 
receives from the corporate fund  nor gain on the redemption or sale of the 
corporate  fund's  shares  is  unrelated  business  income  to  the  exempt 
organization investor.  The income and gain to the exempt organization is tax 
exempt, even if the corporate fund incurs substantial amounts of debt in the 
course of  investing. 
A U.S. corporation is not the best choice for the hedge fund because 
the corporation itself will attract a federal  income tax on its profit from its 
investing and trading activities and thereby lose part of  its investment return to 
the  income  tax.  So  long  as  state  law or the  exempt  organization's  own 
governing  documents  do  not  prohibit  offshore  investments,  exempt 
organizations  capture  their  most  favorable  tax  position  by  investing  in 
offshore hedge funds.  Even if  the offshore fund is a feeder fund that invests 
its capital into the U.S. master fund, the offshore fund is still the better choice 
for exempt organization investors.  This is so as long as the offshore fund, if 
an eligible entity, does not elect U.S. partnership status for tax purposes.295 
An offshore hedge fund is not a U.S.  person for federal  income tax 
purposes,  since  it is  a company formed  in and governed by the  laws of a 
foreign jurisdiction?96  Under U.S. tax law, offshore corporations need not file 
federal income tax returns,297 unless they engage in a trade or business in the 
United States and derive income that is  effectively connected with that U.S. 
trade or business.298  Even if  the foreign corporation maintains an office in the 
United States that is the source of its  trading activity, trading securities  or 
291  T.R.C.  §§  511(a)  (imposing  a  tax on  unrelated business  income),  512(a)(I) (defining 
unrelated business taxable income). 
292  LR.C.  § 514 (including that percentage of income from property in unrelated business 
taxable income as equals percentage of  debt finaocing of  property). 
293  See  infra  Part 5,  however,  for  use  of derivative  products  for  leverage  that  may not 
constitute borrowing. 
294 LR.C. § 702(b) (2003). 
295 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (2006). 
296 LR.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2006). 
297 LR.C. § 6012(a), flush language and Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2) (2006). 
298 LR.C. § 882 and Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(I). Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  363 
commodities  for  its  own  account  does  not  constitute  a  U.S.  trade  or 
business.299 
Most income of a foreign corporation that is not effectively connected 
with  a  U.S.  trade  or business  of that corporation remains  free  from  U.S. 
income tax.  Non--effectively connected gain that a non-U.S. person realizes 
from the sale or exchange of  securities or commodities, even if  sold on a U.S. 
exchange and even if stock in a U.S. corporation, is foreign source income to 
a non-resident and not subject to U.S. tax.300  The United States collects a 
withholding  tax  at  the payment source  for  many periodic  payments  from 
United States  sources  to  a  foreign  entity.  Source  withholding  applies  to 
interest,  dividends,  and royalties  that non-U.S.  persons  receive  from  U.S. 
sources.301  It also applies to gain from the sale of  intellectual property where 
payments are a function of the property's productivity,302 and to the proceeds 
from the sale of U.S. real property interests.303  Exceptions for interest from 
bank deposits304 and portfolio interes~05 leave little interest income subject to 
the  withholding tax.  Since  capital  gain  from  securities  and  commodities 
trading and portfolio interest constitute the bulk of  the offshore hedge fund's 
income, the fund would pay little or no U.S. income tax. 
If the  offshore  fund  is  a  feeder  to  the  U.S.  master  partnership, 
partnership tax rules preserve the character of  the partnership's income in the 
hands  of the  offshore  partner.306  Preserving  character  complicates  the 
offshore  corporation's tax status,  since the partnership claims to  be in the 
299  LR.C.  §  864(b)(2)(A)(ii),  (B)(ii)  (excluding  trading  securities  and  commodities 
respectively for  one's own account from the  U.S.  trade  or business definition).  Like the 
introduction of  section 3(c)(7) funds, supra part 2, in 1997, Congress liberalized this trade or 
business exception to accommodate the hedge fund industry.  Before amendment by section 
1162(a)  of the  Taxpayer  Relief Act of 1997,  Pub.  L.  No.  105-34,  a  securities  trading 
corporation with its principal office in the United States was engaged in a trade or business in 
the U.S.  Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(iii) sets forth ten criteria (that participants in the hedge fund 
industry referred to as the "Ten Commandments") to determine whether or not the corporation 
had its principal office outside the United States.  This rule led U.S. hedge fund managers to 
establish their bases of operation offshore - with a commensurate loss of revenue to states, 
like New York and Connecticut, where they have had their offices since the 1997 change. 
300 LR-C. § 865(a)(2). 
301  ld.  §  871(a)(I)  (30%  withholding  for  individual  recipients);  ld.  §  881(a)(I)  (30% 
withholding for corporate recipients).  Tax treaties with most industrialized countries reduce 
the withholding tax on dividends and many royalty payments to  10% or less, but the treaty 
reductions rarely apply to the low-tax jurisdictions in which hedge funds have their residence. 
See id §§ 1441, 1442 for the withholding obligation imposed on the payer. 
302 1 d.  § 871 (a)(4) (30% withholding tax on the gain). 
303ld  § 1445 (10% withholding tax at the source on the proceeds from the sale of  U.S. real 
property interests, as defined in LR-C.  § 897(c».  Foreign corporations may elect to treat 
income from U.S. real property interests as a trade or business under LR.C. § 882(d), so that it 
may file a return and claim deductions for the expenses, including depreciation. 
304 ld. §§ 871(i)(I), 881(d). 
305 1d.  §§ 871(h), 881(c). 
306 ld. § 702(b).  See discussion supra in text accompanying note 294. 364  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
trade or business of trading securities or commodities in order to position its 
U.S. individual partners to deduct their shares of expenses free from the 2% 
floor  on miscellaneous  itemized  deductions.307  If engaged  in  a  trade  or 
business,  the  partnership  must withhold on any  foreign  partner's share  of 
partnership income,308 and not just on periodic income subject to withholding 
at the source.309  While not free from doubt, the specific income sourcing rules 
should override the partnership's general trade or business characterization.310 
With respect to the offshore corporation, as long as the partnership is a trader, 
as opposed to a dealer, in securities or commodities, the corporation through 
the  partnership  is  not engaged in a  U.S.  trade  or business.  Accordingly, 
income from the partnership is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or 
business.  Income from the partnership is subject to withholding at the source 
only  to  the  extent  of the  periodic  payments  withholding  rules  discussed 
above
311  and not the more far  reaching partnership  income  withholding.
312 
Gain from trading in securities and commodities is not taxable to the offshore 
fund.  Neither the  fund,  nor its  non-U.S.  person and exempt organization 
investors are taxable on the offshore fund's share of  the master partnership's 
income from trading securities or commodities. 
D.  Manager's Compensation Deferral Offihore 
Operation of offshore hedge funds with only tax exempt and foreign 
investors offered U.S. based hedge fund managers the opportunity to  defer 
significant amounts of their compensation without cost to the fund.
313  The 
manager was not currently taxable when the hedge funds, rather than paying 
the fees to the manager, contributed all or part of  the manager's fees to a trust 
for the manager's benefit.  Deferral of  compensation was possible because the 
trust's  assets  remained  subject  to  the  claims  of the  fund's  creditors.314 
Commonly referred to as a "rabbi trust," the manager did not have to include 
the trust's assets in income until the trust released them to the manager or, if 
earlier, the fund's creditors no longer had a claim to them.  U.S. corporations 
307 Id.  § 67.  See discussion supra in text accompanying note 255. 
308Id  § 1446 (requiring payment by a partnership ofa withholding tax on a foreign partner's 
share oftbe partnership's effectively connected income). 
309 !d.  § 881. 
310 [d.  § 864(b  )(2), supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
311  Id.  §§ 871, 881, supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
312 Id.  § 1446, supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
313 See Henry Ordower, A Theoremfor Compensation Deferral:  Doubling Your Blessings By 
Taking  Your  Rabbi Abroad,  47 THE  TAX  LAWYER  301,  at Part III.E.  (1994)  (discussing 
offshore application of  rabbi trusts). 
314 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that, as long as the service recipient's creditors 
may reach the funds,  no transfer has occurred for purposes of I.R.C.  § 83  (governing the 
timing and amount of inclusion in income and deduction on transfers to a person other than 
the payer for the benefit of a  service provider).  Accordingly, the service provider has no 
compensation income because a transfer is necessary to the inclusion. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  365 
commonly use rabbi trusts to defer compensation for top corporate managers, 
but the  cost to  the  corporation  of providing  the  benefit  is  deferral  of its 
compensation deduction until the managers include the rabbi trust assets in 
their income.
315  Unlike taxable U.s. corporations, however, offshore hedge 
funds  were ideal  candidates  for the use of rabbi  trusts  because  they were 
indifferent to the compensation deduction - not being subject to U.s. income 
tax  in any event.  Recent changes  in deferred compensation rules  severely 
restricted use  of offshore  rabbi  trusts,316  and imposed strict  guidelines  on 
domestic use of  such deferral arrangements.
317 
E.  Passive Foreign Investment Companies 
Offshore corporations that serve as acceptable investment pools for tax 
exempt investors are passive foreign investment companies ("PFIC") for U.S. 
tax purposes.318  Before the Department of the Treasury introduced elective 
tax classification of entities in  1997,319  taxable U.s. investors did invest in 
offshore hedge funds even though they were PFICs.  While PFIC status has no 
impact  on  tax  exempt  U.S.  investors,320  it  affects  taxable  U.s.  investors 
adversely by classifying some gain the U.s. shareholders might receive from 
the investment as ordinary income rather than long term capital gain.  It also 
imposes an interest charge on certain distributions from the funds  and gains 
recognized from the sale of  interests in those funds.321  The interest charge is 
designed to offset the deferral benefit the taxpayer otherwise would capture 
because  the  corporation's  income  is  not subject to u.s. taxation  and  the 
shareholder not taxable until receiving a distribution on or selling the shares. 
u.s. investors may avoid both the interest charge and the ordinary income 
treatment by electing a  current inclusion in income  of their shares  of the 
PFIC's income each year.322  This qualified electing fund election323  causes 
the U.s. shareholder to include a proportional share of  the fund's income each 
year.  Imputation of  the fund's income to the shareholder separates the PFIC's 
net capital gain from its other income,324 preserving net capital gain as long 
term capital  gain  to the  shareholder in  much the  same  mauner  as  a  RIC 
315 LR.C. § 83(h) (2006). 
316Id.  § 409A(b) (added by section 885(a) of  the American Jobs Creation Act of  2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-357 (Oct. 22, 2004)). 
317 T.R.C. § 409A(a). 
318 LR.C. § 1291-98. 
319 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. 
320 See discussion supra commencing with the text accompanying note 289. 
321  LR.C.  §1291(a) (imposing ordinary income tax and  an interest charge on distributions 
from a PFIC and gain from the sale ofPFIC shares). 
322  Philip  S.  Gross,  Tax  Planning for Offshore Hedge Funds  - the Potential Benefits of 
Investing in a PFIC, J. OF TAX'N OF INvESTMENTS 187 (2004). 
323  LR.C.  §  1295  (requiring the U.S.  taxpayer to elect and the PFIC to agree to  provide 
information necessary to the electing taxpayer's reporting). 
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does.325  Unlike a RIC, no actual distribution is necessary to carry the income 
to the shareholder and the shareholder's adjusted basis in the RIC increases by 
the  amount  of the  inclusion.  The  PFIC  may distribute  amounts  to  the 
shareholders  without  further  tax  equal  to  the  income  on  which  the 
shareholders paid tax under the imputation.  Since the imputed inclusion in the 
shareholders'  income  is  a  function  of the  PFIC's net income,326  offshore 
hedge funds with taxable U.S.  investors are not suitable for deferral of the 
manager's  compensation  through  a  rabbi  trust.  Current  deduction  for 
compensation  is  valuable  to  the  U.S.  shareholders  because  the  deduction 
diminishes taxable income to the shareholders. 
V.  INvESTMENT POLICIES AND LEVERAGE 
Hedge funds tend to emphasize specific investment strategies in which 
their  managers  have  or  claim  expertise.  A  reporter  for  the  hedge  fund 
industry327 identifies seven main categories of  hedge funds:  (1) event driven, 
(2) global, (3) global/macro, (4) market neutral, (5) sectors, (6) short sellers, 
and (7) long only.328  Briefly, event driven strategies follow specific types of 
events,  corporate  takeovers,  for  example,  and  invest  either  to  capture  an 
arbitrage profit in anticipation of the event or in the debt or equity securities 
emerging from those events.  Global funds emphasize investment in securities 
of non-U.S.  issuers  and  may  feature  specific  world  regions,  emerging 
markets,  or  specific  countries.  Sectors  funds  focus  on  specific  business 
sectors, biotechnology, for example.  Long funds  invest for appreciation in 
value, as do equity mutual funds generally.  In the retail markets, registered 
investment companies, including both mutual funds and registered qualified 
client funds,329 specialize as well in each of  those investment strategies:  event 
driven, global, sectors, and long only funds.  In addition, hedge funds may 
invest  in  a  portfolio  of section  3cl  and  3c7  hedge  funds.  Subject  to 
diversification  requirements  for  registered  funds,  re~istered  investment 
companies also might invest in section 3c1 and 3c7 funds.  30 
325 See RIC discussion supra at note 224 and accompanying text. 
326  I.R.C.  §  1293(a), (e) bases the imputed income on the company's current earnings and 
profits, computed under LR.C. §312.  Because of  the tie to earnings and profits, the PFIC's 
ordinary earnings include any tax exempt income that the PFTC  may have converts  into 
taxable income in the shareholders' hands. 
327  Managed  Account  Reports  LLC  publishes  MARlHedge,  available  at 
http://www.marhedge.com!.  (a report  on hedge fund activities,  and identifies  seven  basic 
hedge fund categories). 
320 See William Fund and DavidA. Hsieh, A primer on hedge funds, supra note 38, at 319, for 
explanation of  the various strategies.  Similarly, Bankim Chadha & Anne Jansen,  supra note 
17, at 27, 29. 
329 See discussion supra in text accompanying and following note 199. 
330 Investment Company Act IS U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(c), (d) (2006).  See discussion at note 5 and 
The France Growth Fund, Inc., 2003 SEC No-Action Letter. LEXTS 624, supra note lIS. Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  367 
Global/macro funds, on the other hand, emphasize specific risk factors, 
such as  stock indices,  currencies,  and commodities.  They may take  large, 
directional positions where managers conclude that governmental intervention 
in a country or region is inconsistent with macroeconomic conditions so that a 
shift  is  likely  to  occur.  For  example,  a  country  may  peg  its  currency 
unrealistically to  a  specific  exchange  rate  with the  dollar,  allowing  macro 
funds  to  anticipate an  exchange rate adjustment when the markets  will not 
sustain the governmental decision.  Market neutral funds  use long-short and 
arbitrage strategies.  Short-sellers trade on predictions of loss in the value of 
securities.  These  last  three  categories  of investment  strategy  involve 
investment  activities  that  necessarily  include  short  selling  and,  therefore, 
generally  are  unavailable  to  the  registered  investment  company  industry 
because  short  selling  involves  exposure  to  debt  that  investment  company 
regulation limits.
331 
Among  other  characteristics,  leverage  from  borrowing  distinguishes 
section 3cl and 3c7 hedge funds  from registered investment companies.  As 
registered investment companies, mutual funds and qualified client funds may 
not incur debt unless the fund has net assets with value at least three times the 
amount of the  debt. 332  Although the  SEC  has not promulgated regulations 
implementin~ the  specific prohibitions of margin purchase of securities and 
short selling,  33 the SEC views both margininl and short selling as limited by 
the general net asset coverage requirement.  33  If they properly disclose their 
investment policies and risks,  mutual funds  may employ leverage freely  as 
long as they capture leverage without incurring debt.  The SEC has expressed 
concern  about the  fund  volatility that  emanates  from  the  extensive  use  of 
various  derivative products that create no  debt-like obligation but magnify 
gains and 10sses.
335 
Leverage magnifies gains and losses thereby rendering the investment 
more volatile than an investment without leverage.  Both borrowing
336  and 
331  15 U.S.C. § SOa-IS.  See note 334 infra. 
332 Id.  § SOa-18(a) (applicable to closed-end funds); Id § 80a-18(f) (applicable to open-end 
funds). 
333Id.  § 80a-12(a). 
334 Guidelines for the Preparation of  Form N-8B-l, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (1972) (treating short 
sales and margin purchases as forms of  indebtedness or senior securities subject to Investment 
Company Act § 18). 
335 Mutoal Fund Use of  Derivatives, supra note 6S. 
336 For a simple illustration of  the leverage through borrowing concept, consider the following 
examples.  Tfone borrows $100 for one year and must repay $105 (5% interest) at the end of 
the year but can invest the $100 so that the borrower receives 6% retorn on invested funds, 
$106 at the end of  the year on the $100 investment, after repaying the debt, the borrower has a 
net gain of  $1  on a zero investment.  On the other hand, if  the investment yields only $104 at 
the end of the year, the borrower must provide $1  from her own funds in order to repay the 
lender - a loss of $1  on a zero investment.  If  the borrower borrows the $100 and invests her 
own $100  as  well,  borrowing  has  increased  a  6% retorn  to a  7% retorno  That  is,  the 
investment yields a 6% return on $200 -- $12 plus return of  the original invested funds.  After 368  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
positions in derivative products337  create leverage and fund volatility.  On a 
large  scale,  positive  leverage  can  enhance  the  return  from  a  successful 
investment radically, but negative leverage from the unsuccessful, leveraged 
investment rapidly  diminishes  investors'  capital.  The  volatility that  large 
amounts  of leverage  cause  increases  the  risk  profile  of an  investment. 
Investors  in hedge  funds  (and mutual  funds)  rarely are  willing  to  assume 
personal liability for losses in excess of  their invested capital, yet, both debt or 
investment leverage can cause unanticipated and sometimes immediate loss of 
the invested capital. 
The  SEC  applies  the  general  investment  company  limitations  on 
debf38  to  derivative  products  that  create  financial  obligations,  including 
futures  contracts,  forward  contracts,  and  the  writing,  as  opposed  to  the 
purchase/39  of an  option.340  Those  guidelines permit registered investment 
companies  to  invest  in  positions  that  impose  a  possible  future  payment 
obligation on the  investment company,  as  long as  the  investment company 
segregates  enou~ of its  assets  to  cover the  obligation.  Like  a short  sale 
against the box,3  1 the segregated account sets aside funds as necessary for the 
repaying $105 to the lender, the borrower has $107 left.  On the other hand, in the 4% return 
example, the borrower has decreased a 4% return to a 3% return ($208 less $105 repayment 
leaves $103).  A larger borrowing, i.e. greater leverage, say $900 at 5% plus the out of  pocket 
$100, a 6% return on the $1000 investment yields $1060 at the end of the year, leaving the 
investor with $115 after repaying $945 for a return leveraged from 6% to  15%, but a 4% 
return yields $1040 leaving the investor with only $95 after repaying the $945 for a negatively 
leveraged return of  -5%, a loss of  $5 out of  pocket. 
337  Derivative products  are  positions that are  not ownership of an underlying tangible  or 
intangible property but that change in value relative to the change in value of the underlying 
property.  For example, equity options are derivatives and provide an easily understood form 
ofleverage.  Assume an investor with $100 who may purchase for the $100 either (i) I sbare 
of  XXX Corporation stock or (ii) an option to purchase 200 shares of  XXX Corporation stock 
at the current market price of $100 per sbare.  Tn the case of  the option, the original $100 is 
the option premium paid to the option writer for selling the option to purchase referred to as a 
call option.  If  the stock price advances $10, a purchase of I share produces a 10% return.  If 
the investor purchased the option, however, the investor will be able to buy 200 sbares for 
$100  per share  and sell  them  immediately  for  $11 0  each,  netting  $2000  less  the  option 
premium  $100  for  a  return  of $1900  or  1900%,  quite  a  difference  achieved  through 
leveraging.  On the other hand, if  the XXX Corporation shares remain at $100 per share, the 
share purchaser loses nothing, but the option purchaser loses 100% of  her investment - she 
will not exercise the option and loses the option premium. 
338 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2006). 
339 The option writer has an obligation to deliver the subject of the option in kind or settle in 
cash with the purchaser of  an option, while the purchaser's obligation ends with payment of 
the option premium.  The purchaser of  an option has no obligation to exercise the option. 
340  Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, Release No.  10666, 
1979 SEC LEXIS 1744 (SEC 1979). 
341  Short sale against the  box refers  to a  short sale when the short seller holds the  same 
securities  in its  portfolio  and  could  use  the  portfolio  securities  to  return  the  borrowed 
securities if  necessary.  A short sale is the sale of  borrowed securities in the expectation that 
the  securities  will  have  declined in value  when  it  comes  time  to  return  the  borrowed Ed. 2]  Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer  369 
cover.  The investment company must fund the segregated account with high 
grade  liquid securities,  such as  government bonds,  and cash.  It also  must 
mark the risk position to market daily, so that the investment company may 
adjust the amount in the segregated account to cover any decline in the value 
of the position.
342  Segregation limits the amount of debt-type leverage the 
investment company may employ by making the segregated funds unavailable 
for any other purpose. 
No similar limit applies to leverage that involves no future obligation, 
like a purchased option, for example.  However, disclosure of  the investment 
policy and risk may be necessary in the fund's prospectus and other public 
documents.
343  Further, derivatives that do not trade on an established market 
may involve significant counterparty risk.
344  Where an established trading 
market exists, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, for example, the market 
operates as a hedged intermediary that standardizes the contractual terms and 
serves as  the counterparty on all market traded contracts.
345  In the case of 
over  the  counter  contracts,  there  may  be  no  hedged  intermediary  as  the 
contract counterparty or the hedged intermediary that is the counterparty may 
become unable to collect on cash settlements owed to it.  In either instance, 
and  despite  requirements  for  collateralization  from  its  counterparties,  the 
counterparty  may  not  meet  its  obligations  under  the  contract,  especially 
following sudden market movements adverse to the counterparty's investment 
strategy.  Most often, however, the counterparty will be an established and 
reliable fmancial institution that remains perfectly or nearly perfectly hedged 
securities.  The short seller then may purchase replacement securities on the market for a 
lower price than that for which the short seller sold the borrowed securities.  That differential 
between the short sale price and the cover purchase price is profit to the short seller.  If, 
however, the underlying security increases in value, rather than decreasing as the short sale 
anticipates, the short seller has to buy the cover at a price higher than the short sale price, and 
that purchase will cause an overall loss.  If  the seller has portfolio securities for cover, the 
seller is protected from  having  to  buy the  securities  at the  higher price  on the  market. 
Generally, tax rather than economic strategies precipitate a short sale against the  box since 
economically, if  one anticipates decline in value, one may lock the current value by selling the 
p,0rtfolio securities. 
42 Securities Trading Practices, supra note 340, in section SEGREGATED ACCOUNT, note 
15 and text. 
343  Id at note  18  referring  to  the  registration  statement  under  section  80a-8(b)  of the 
Investment Company Act, reports  to  shareholders under section  30,  sales  literature  under 
section 24(b), and proxy statements under section 20. 
344 Counterparty refers to the other party to a two party derivative contract. 
345  Exchanges  issue  offsetting positions,  so  that when  one position  retreats  in value,  the 
offsetting position advances in value in an equal amount leaving the issuer protected (hedged) 
against loss.  Commodities futures exchanges require purchases of  position to post margin and 
to increase their margin deposits whenever their positions decline in value.  Margin is amount 
slightly greater than the excess of the obligation of  the investor over the current value of the 
position, that is, margin exceeds the amount the investor would have to pay if the investor 
closed out the position by purchasing an offsetting position currently.  Margin protects the 
exchange from the financial failure ofthe investor. 370  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
on its  derivative positions.  It functions  much  like  a  commodities  futures 
exchange as a facilitator and receives a fee, rather than an investment return, 
for serving as a derivative contract intermediary.  It establishes procedures to 
monitor the values of its positions and the collateral that counterparties have 
posted with it.  Nevertheless, its fmancial stability is never quite so firm as 
most of  the established options and futures exchanges. 
No similar constraints on leverage apply to section 3c1  and 3c7 funds. 
They may borrow directly,  subject to  any limitations  that other regulatory 
agencies may impose on lenders or derivative counter parties.  In the United 
States, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Comptroller of the Currency, or state 
regulators  may  impose  lending  limits  on  regulated  financial  institutions' 
lending practices.  However, those regulations only indirectly operate on the 
hedge funds.  Indeed the hedge funds may be able to establish different types 
of credit  arrangements  with  a  variety of lenders,  thereby  maximizing  the 
hedge  funds'  access  to  credit.  Likewise,  those  hedge  funds  may  take 
derivative positions without regard to whether the positions impose a future 
obligation on the fund.  The only controls on hedge funds' derivative exposure 
are (i) internal, voluntary controls, if any, designed to prevent the fund from 
taking excessive risk and failing and (ii) the willingness of  derivative counter-
parties to enter into contracts with the hedge fund.  Hedge fund managers who 
have strong reputations, like Long Term Capital Management had in 1998/
46 
have the ability to take investment positions through derivatives and direct 
borrowing that have exposure many times the amount of  their invested capital. 
Part 6.  Conclusion - Additional Regulation Needed? 
As part 2 of  this article demonstrated, the fundamental structure of  the 
Investment  Company  Act,  the  Securities  Act,  and  the  registration 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act enable hedge funds to avoid the 
regulatory framework of those laws.  The statutory design of those Acts and 
the regulations that the SEC has promulgated interpreting those statutes reflect 
Congress's and the SEC's conclusion that certain investors need neither the 
protection  that  registration  offers  nor  the  more  parental  limitations  on 
investment activity and advisory fees  that the Investment Company Act and 
the Advisers Act offer to the public.  Congress confirmed and expanded the 
exemptions  from  registration  when  it  introduced  section  3c7  funds  for 
qualified purchasers in 1997
347 and exempted their advisors from advisory fee 
limits.
348  The SEC further facilitated creation of a type of  registered fund for 
moderately  wealthy  investor  that  could  operate  free  from  advisory  fee 
restrictions.  Antifraud rules suffice to protect the wealthy investing public 
that forms the market for hedge funds.  As they do with all other transactions 
in securities, whether or not exempt from registration, antifraud rules outlaw 
346 See discussion of  Long Term Capital Management, supra note 7. 
347 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2006). 
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market  manipulation  and  require  disclosure  of material  information  even 
when the security in question is an interest in a hedge fund.
349  Little if any 
evidence suggests that registration should be expanded to protect sophisticated 
and wealthy investors.
350  On the contrary, registration impedes the flexibility 
that such investors may wish to have in their selection of  investment structures 
suitable to the investors'  own  risk tolerances.  And both Congress  and the 
Internal  Revenue  Service  have  accommodated  tax  laws  and  their 
interpretation to  the  needs  of the  private  investment  company community. 
The  SEC's  recently  proposed  regulation  that  would  impose  stringent 
disclosure  standards  on  advisers  to  hedge  may  serve  to  enhance  investor 
protection in this area.351 
Similarly,  increased  regulation  of hedge  funds  does  not  seem  the 
correct course for control of leverage risk.  If necessary, increased regulation 
of investors in and lenders to hedge funds would address that concern more 
directly.  If  lenders are at risk because they extend too much credit to hedge 
funds, lending limits and similar regulatory controls - some possibly already 
in  place  but  suffering  from  lax  internal  and  external  enforcemene
52 
-
targeted  to  the  lenders  seem  more  appropriate.  If  some  municipal 
governments, public corporations, or pension plans should not invest in hedge 
funds,  for  others  hedge  funds  might  be  a  perfectly  acceptable  and 
appropriately controlled portion of  their portfolios.  Beyond inquiring whether 
or  not  investors  meet  basic  qualified  purchaser  requirements,353  the 
government  agency  regulating  the  investor's  primary  industry  sector,  the 
investing  corporation's board of directors,  or the  investing  pension  fund's 
managers would be the most suitable targets for regulation because they know 
the investor that is at risk far more intimately than a hedge fund manager can. 
Requiring hedge funds  to monitor the solvency and investment mix of their 
investors  is  impractical.  The  funds  do  not have  and  cannot  at  reasonable 
expense obtain and analyze their investors' portfolios. 
Perhaps  the  existing  statutory  framework  to  prevent  and  sanction 
market  manipulation  inadequately  controls  the  activities  of hedge  funds. 
Increased  transparency  that  would  have  accompanied  registration  of 
investment advisers
354  and,  in  the  future,  possibly hedge  funds  themselves 
under a separate registration regime, unaccompanied by parental limitations 
on  investment  activities  or  fees,  may  have  helped  to  prevent  market 
349 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
350  Accord Sharma,  Sunil  (1998).  "Regulation  of Hedge  Funds,"  in Hedge  Funds  and 
Financial 
Market Dynamics. Occasional Paper Series 166. B. Eichengreen, D. Mathieson 
(Hrsg.). Washington DC.: International Monetary Fund, S.  62; see Dissent of  Commissioners 
Glassman & Atkins, supra note 18. 
351 Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8, 17  C.F.F. § 206(4)-8 (2007 proposed), supra note 2l. 
352 Compare Sunil Sharma, supra note 350, at 67-8. 
353 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2006). 
354 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006), held invalid in Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 19. 372  UC Davis Business Law Journal  [Vol. 7 
manipulation by hedge  funds.  Hedge  funds  may  have  significant  market 
power because of  their ability to raise both equity and debt capital.  If hedge 
funds have sufficient market power to generate significant market movements, 
integrity  and  stability  of the  markets  may  depend  in  part  on  access  to 
information concerning the positions hedge funds hold and trade.  Hedge fund 
managers  are  understandably  opposed  to  and  suspicious  of governmental 
intervention into their activities that have remained free  from regulation for 
many years.  Regulation certainly would have increased the costs of operating 
hedge funds, but the SEC concluded that the compliance cost that it recently 
sought  to  impose  upon hedge  fund  advisers  was  not  great  relative  to  the 
amount of funds  under management.  355  Managers  differed  the  SEC  with 
respect to cost assessment and prevailed in the COurtS.
356 
A  greater  concern  for  managers  may  have  been  that  information 
reporting would provide  access  to  the  managers'  investment strategies  and 
portfolio management techniques that the managers consider to be proprietary 
information.  Compromise of their trade secrets might cost some managers 
their  ability  to  remain  as  successful  as  they  are.  That  concem  seems 
legitimate although it may be only a smokescreen.  Perhaps managers feared 
that investors with greater access to information would learn that many hedge 
fund managers have no great talent for investment management.  In order to 
raise capital, some managers may have relied upon the hedge fund mystique 
that secrecy created.  Once the mystery would disappear, their ability to corral 
investors may have disappeared as well. 
355  Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 18, at 
72,080-1  (estimating  compliance  costs  at  approximately  $50,000).  But see  Dissent  of 
Commissioners Glassman &  Atkins, supra note 72, at 72,095, for a much higher estimate of 
compliance costs. 
356 Goldstein v.  SEC, supra note 19 (holding the regulation counting clients and requiring 
registration of  many hedge fund advisers invalid). I 
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